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1 Introduction
What are the costs and the benefits of a monetary union? Should independent coun-
tries abandon their own currency to delegate monetary policy to a common central
bank? These questions are far from new1 but have been revitalized by the debate
on the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU). On theoretical grounds the
costs of losing monetary autonomy are well known: in presence of nominal rigidities
countries that share the same currency cannot properly stabilize asymmetric shocks.
By contrast, the sources of welfare benefits that can rationalize the existence of a cur-
rency area have not been identified2, at least if we restrict ourselves to the new open
economy macroeconomic literature in which the objectives of the policy makers are
fully microfounded3.
However there is a key aspect seemingly overlooked so far which can explain why a
monetary union can be beneficial for its members. Especially, if we refer to the EMU
experience, it is clear that the European Central Bank (ECB) sets the nominal interest
rate for an economic area which is much bigger than each national economy. The
difference in size may induce an improvement upon the conduct of the single country
monetary policy given that, as stressed also by the recent literature4, open economy
policy makers seek to affect their terms of trade to other countries consumers’ expense.
Indeed on the one hand, by being concerned about the welfare of all consumers living in
the area, the central bank of the monetary union internalizes the spillover effects that
single country’s policy makers would produce inside the area if there were monetary
autonomy. On the other hand, by setting the monetary policy for the union as whole,
the common authority better realizes the impact of its policy decisions on the outside
world and the feedback effects on welfare in its own economy.
The contribution of this paper is to verify whether, once these channels are taken
into account, the adoption of a common currency generates gains in terms of welfare
that outweigh the costs of renouncing monetary policy independence. To this end, I
develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium open economy model in which the
world is constituted by a continuum of small open regions as in Gal´ı and Monacelli
(2005). Each region produces a bundle of differentiated goods. Preferences exhibit
home bias and the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign bundles is dif-
ferent from one. Prices are staggered implying a cost for the adoption of a common
currency due to the impossibility to properly stabilize asymmetric shocks.
The regions are split in two areas, H and F . In area F all regions belong to a single
country (as in the U.S.). Conversely area H is formed by a collection of sovereign small
open economies (as in Europe). In this setup two different policy regimes (called A
and B) are considered. Under regime A, in area H there are flexible exchange rates
1See Mundell (1961).
2As emphasized by the so called Delors report (1989), there are microeconomic benefits from adopting a
common currency like, for instance, saving in transaction costs. However it would be difficult to incorporate
this kind of costs in a macroeconomics model.
3....namely derived directly from the welfare of the representative household. See Rotemberg and Wood-
ford (1997) and Benigno and Woodford (2005). There is a recent contribution of Corsetti (2007) on this
issue who, in a model with heterogeneous countries, identifies the conditions under which monetary policy
in a currency union is as efficient as under monetary autonomy.
4See for instance Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Epifani and Gancia (2005).
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and each small open economy has its own autonomous central bank; under regime B in
area H there is a single currency and monetary policy is under the control of a common
central bank (ECB). Instead in area F , independently of the policy regimes, all regions
share a common currency and monetary policy is delegated to a single authority (FED).
Moreover, in both regimes A and B monetary policies are chosen under commitment
and are optimal from the timeless perspective5.
In this kind of setting optimal policy decisions of open economy authorities are
biased by a free riding problem. Under the assumption of complete financial markets,
consumption is highly correlated both across area and across regions. Because of this
consumption sharing, single countries’ policy makers have an incentive to seek to im-
prove their terms of trade in their favor6. Through a terms of trade improvement,
they try to squeeze the domestic/foreign output ratio to outsource labour effort. How-
ever their optimal monetary policies are affected in different ways by this incentive
depending on the dimension of their own economy.
Under the baseline calibration small countries’ policy makers perceive per-period
domestic output as inefficiently high. They would rather prefer to lower home produc-
tion and substitute consumption with leisure. Indeed since the economy is small, one
unit decrease in domestic output - which does not affect world output - brings about a
marginal decrease in labour that more than outweighs the consumption drop. This has
a clear consequence for optimal monetary policy. In fact, by increasing the covariance
between output and mark up shocks (which is typically negative), the authorities of a
small open economy can induce domestic workers to enjoy more leisure contracting, by
so doing, the per-period domestic production. In other words given that they regard
home output as too high, these policy makers have a motive to focus more on output
than inflation stabilization in response to a global mark up shock.
By contrast, under the baseline calibration the central bank of the monetary union
considers per-period domestic production as too low. This is because its incentive to
manipulate the terms of trade is much weaker than that of policy makers of the small
open economy. Indeed, the authority of the currency union internalizes the feedback
effects of its policy decisions stemming from the other area. Then it realizes that
a terms of trade improvement is dampening the domestic/ foreign output ratio not
only by squeezing the demand for domestic goods (reducing domestic production) but
even by boosting that for foreign ones (thus increasing foreign output). As a result,
this policy maker is willing to adopt a policy that weights more inflation than output
stabilization allowing for a rise in the per-period domestic production.
These differences in incentives explain the differences in outcomes across policy
regimes. In regime B policy makers are exactly symmetric; thus under global mark
up shocks, they choose the same optimal monetary policy, thereby ensuring the same
economic performance in the two areas. Conversely, in regime A, the monetary author-
ities of the two areas have opposite goals. By seeking to reduce per-period domestic
5See Benigno and Woodford (2005) and Woodford (2003).
6The effects of this externality are amplified by the hypothesis of home bias for both the bundles produced
within the region and within the area as well as by the assumption that the elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign bundles is different from one. For a discussion see Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) , Benigno
and Benigno (2003) and Pappa (2004). Notice that other policy instruments to affect terms of trade, such
as tariffs, cannot be used in the WTO.
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output, the central banks of the small open countries weighs more output than inflation
stabilization. On the other hand given that from their perspective domestic output is
on average too low, the policy maker of the monetary union focuses more on inflation
than on output stabilization. Then in response, for instance, to a negative symmetric
mark up shock, small open countries’ authorities adopt a more restrictive policy than
the policy maker of the monetary union. Therefore there is more deflation in area H
and output in area F expands more than under regime B.
These differences across regimes explain why, despite the presence of idiosyncratic
shocks, households of area H can be better off by sharing a common currency. Indeed, I
show that, in the presence of mark up shocks, adopting the same currency may generate
welfare benefits under reasonable calibrations. This finding is quite robust: even for
relatively low level of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign bundles and high levels of the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks, welfare gains
may be significant.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic setup, section 3 de-
termines the equilibrium conditions, section 4 formulates the optimal policy problems,
section 5 describes the dynamic simulation and section 6 reports the results about the
welfare evaluation.
2 The basic framework
The world consists of a continuum of small open regions indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]7. The
regions are subdivided in two areas, H and F . In area H, there is a continuum of
regions indexed by i ∈ [0, 12), which are independent countries. Area F consists of
regions indexed by i ∈ [12 , 1], which belong to a single country. Each region produces
a continuum of imperfect substitutable goods. Labour is immobile across both regions
and areas.
2.1 Preferences
Agents are infinitely lived and maximize the expected value of the discounted sum of
the period utility. Preferences of a generic region i representative household are defined
over a private consumption bundle, Cit and labor N
i
t (s):
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
Cit
1−σ
1− σ −
N it (s)
ϕ+1
ϕ+ 1
]
0 < β < 1 (1)
where β stands for the intertemporal preferences discount factor. Agents consume
all the goods produced in the world economy. However, preferences exhibit home bias.
7This model is a general version of the basic framework layout by Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) and Gal´ı
and Monacelli (2007).
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The private consumption index is a CES aggregation of the following type:
Cit ≡
[
α
1
η
s C
i
i,t
η−1
η + (αb − αs)
1
ηCiH,t
η−1
η + (1− αb)
1
ηCiF,t
η−1
η
] η
η−1
i ∈
[
0,
1
2
)
(2)
Cit ≡
[
α
1
η
s C
i
i,t
η−1
η + (αb − αs)
1
ηCiF,t
η−1
η + (1− αb)
1
ηCiH,t
η−1
η
] η
η−1
i ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
(3)
η > 0, 0 < αs < αb and
1
2 < αb < 1. αs and αb are the degrees of home bias for the
goods produced within region i and the area to which region i belongs. Moreover, η
denotes the elasticity of substitution among CiH,t C
i
F,t, C
i
i,t which are defined as:
CiH,t ≡
[
2
1
η
∫ 1
2
0
Cij,t
η−1
η dj
] η
η−1
CiF,t ≡
[
2
1
η
∫ 1
1
2
Cij,t
η−1
η dj
] η
η−1
(4)
Cij,t ≡
(∫ 1
0
cit(h
j)
ε−1
ε dhj
) ε
ε−1
j ∈
[
0,
1
2
)
Cij,t ≡
(∫ 1
0
cit(f
j)
ε−1
ε df j
) ε
ε−1
i ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
(5)
where ε is the elasticity of substitution among goods produced in the same region. The
definitions of the private consumption indexes (2), (4) and (5) enable us to determine
consistent definitions of price indexes. In particular, PCi,t, the consumers’ price index
of region i, is:
PCi,t ≡
[
αsPi,t
1−η + (αb − αs)PH,t1−η + (1− αb)PF,t1−η
] 1
1−η i ∈
[
0,
1
2
)
(6)
PCi,t ≡
[
αsPi,t
1−η + (αb − αs)PF,t1−η + (1− αb)PH,t1−η
] 1
1−η i ∈
[1
2
, 1
]
(7)
PH,t ≡
[
2
∫ 1
2
0
Pj,t
1−ηdj
] 1
1−η
PF,t ≡
[
2
∫ 1
1
2
Pj,t
1
1−η dj
] 1
1−η
Pj,t ≡
(∫ 1
0
pt(h
j)
1−ε
dhj
) 1
1−ε
j ∈
[
0,
1
2
)
Pj,t ≡
(∫ 1
0
pt(f
j)
1−ε
df j
) 1
1−ε
j ∈
[1
2
, 1
]
where all prices are denominated in the currency of the home country. Thus Pi,t, PH,t
and PF,t are producers’ price indexes. The law of one price is assumed to hold in
all single good markets. However, given the home biased preferences, in general the
purchasing power parity does not hold for indexes PCi,t.
2.2 Consumption demand, portfolio choices and labor sup-
ply
The consumption and price index definitions allow to solve the consumer problem in
two stages. In a first stage, agents decide how much real net income to allocate to buy
goods produced at home and abroad. According to the set of optimality conditions, it
is possible to determine agents’ demands as:
Cii,t = αs
(
Pi,t
PCi,t
)−η
Cit C
i
H,t = (αb−αs)
(
PH,t
PCi,t
)−η
Cit C
i
F,t = (1−αb)
(
PF,t
PCi,t
)−η
Cit i ∈
[
0,
1
2
)
(8)
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Cii,t = αs
(
Pi,t
PCi,t
)−η
Cit C
i
F,t = (αb−αs)
(
PF,t
PCi,t
)−η
Cit C
i
H,t = (1−αb)
(
PH,t
PCi,t
)−η
Cit i ∈
(1
2
, 1
]
(9)
and for i ∈
[
0, 12
)
:
Cij,t = 2
(
Pj,t
PH,t
)−η
CiH,t j ∈
[
0,
1
2
)
Cij,t = 2
(
Pj,t
PF,t
)−η
CiF,t j ∈
(1
2
, 1
]
(10)
cit(h
j) =
(
pt(h
j)
Pj,t
)−ε
Cij,t j ∈
[
0,
1
2
)
cit(f
j) =
(
pt(f
j)
Pj,t
)−ε
Cij,t j ∈
(1
2
, 1
]
(11)
while for i ∈
(
1
2 , 1
]
:
Cij,t = 2
(
Pj,t
PF,t
)−η
CiF,t j ∈
[
0,
1
2
)
Cij,t = 2
(
Pj,t
PH,t
)−η
CiH,t j ∈
(1
2
, 1
]
(12)
cit(f
j) =
(
pt(f
j)
Pj,t
)−ε
Cij,t j ∈
[
0,
1
2
)
cit(h
j) =
(
pt(h
j)
Pj,t
)−ε
Cij,t j ∈
(1
2
, 1
]
(13)
The second stage coincides with the standard consumer problem. Agents maximize
(1) with respect to Cit , D
i
t+1 and N
i
t (s) subject to the following sequence of budget
constraints:
Et{Qit,t+1Dit+1} = Dit +Wi,t(s)N it (s)− PCi,tCit + T it (14)
N it (s) =
(
Wi,t(s)
Wi,t
)−υit
N it (15)
where:
Wi,t ≡
[∫ 1
0
Wi,t(s)
1−υitds
] 1
1−υit
(16)
Condition (14) is the budget constraint which states that nominal saving, net of lump
sum transfers, has to equalize the nominal value of a state contingent portfolio. In fact,
Wi,t(s) stands for the per hour nominal wage, Q
i
t,t+1 denotes what is usually called the
stochastic discount factor and Dit+1 is the payoff of one period maturity portfolio of
firm shares.
Constraint (15) is a consequence of a CES aggregation of labor inputs which will
be specified below and states that the labour market is monopolistically competitive.
Indeed each agent offers a different kind of labour service. Thus υit stands for the
elasticity of demand of labor which is time-varying and region-specific as in Clarida,
Gal´ı and Gertler (2002). Finally, (16) is simply the aggregate wage index. Domestic
and international markets are assumed to be complete.
By the optimality conditions of the household problem:
(1 + µit)N
i
t (s)
ϕ
Cit
σ
=
Wi,t
PCi,t
(17)
β
(
Cit+1
Cit
)−σ (
PCi,t
PCi,t+1
)
= Qit,t+1 (18)
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which hold in all states of nature and at all periods and where µit ≡ 1υit−1 . According
to (17), workers set the real wage as mark up over the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure, while the value of the intertemporal marginal rate
of substitution of consumption should equalize the stochastic discount factor expressed
in terms of the currency of region i. Notice that since wages are perfectly flexible,
N it (s)=N
i
t and Wi,t(s)=Wi,t for all s and t.
2.3 Firms, technology and price setting
In each region i there is a continuum of firms. Each of them produces a single differ-
entiated good with a constant return to scale technology of the type:
yt(h
i) = AitNt(h
i) (19)
with Nt(h
i) =
[∫ 1
0 N
i
t (s)
υit−1
υit ds
] υit
υit−1
being the labor input and Ait the region-specific
technology shock. Given (19) and the fact that N it = N
i
t (s) for all h
i, the aggregate
relationship between output and labor can be read as:
N it =
Y it
Ait
Zit (20)
where Y it ≡
[∫ 1
0 y
i
t(h)
ε−1
ε dh
] ε
ε−1
and Zit ≡
∫ 1
0
yt(hi)
Y it
dhi, and N it ≡
∫ 1
0 Nt(h
i)dhi. Using
(10) and (11) I will show below that Zt ≡
∫ 1
0
(
pt(hi)
Pi,t
)−ε
dhi; thus Zit can be interpreted
as an index of the relative price dispersion across firms. We assume that good prices
adjust according to a staggered mechanism a` la Calvo. Therefore, in each period a
given firm can reoptimize its price only with probability 1−θ. As a result, the fraction
of firms that set a new price is fixed and the aggregate producer price index of the
intermediate goods evolves accordingly to:
P
(1−ε)
i,t = θP
(1−ε)
i,t−1 + (1− θ)p˜i,t(hi)
(1−ε)
(21)
with p˜t(h
i) being the optimal price. Firms maximize the discounted expected sum of
the future profits that would be collected if the optimal price could not be changed.
∞∑
s=0
(θ)sEt
{
Qit,t+syt+s(h
i)
[
p˜t(h
i)−MCni,t+s
]}
(22)
where yt(h
i) = (pt(h
i)
Pi,t
)−εY it and MCni,t =
(1−τ i)Wi,t
Ait
is the nominal marginal cost with τ i
denoting a constant labor subsidy. Taking into account (18) and that MCi,t ≡ MC
n
i,t
Pi,,t
,
the optimality condition of the firm problem can be written as:
∞∑
s=0
(βθ)sEt
{
Cit+s
−σ
(
p˜t(h
i)
Pi,t+s
)−ε
Y it+s
Pi,t
PCi,t+s
[
p˜t(h
i)
Pi,t
− ε
ε− 1
Pi,t+s
Pi,t
MCi,t+s
]}
= 0
(23)
7
Condition (23) states implicitly that firms reset their prices as a mark up over a
weighted average of the current and expected marginal costs, where the weight of
the expected marginal cost at some date t + s depends on the probability that the
price is still effective at that date.
3 Equilibrium
International risk sharing
The assumption of complete markets implies:
Cit
−σ
PCi,t
=
Cjt
−σ
Eij,tPCj ,t
(24)
for all t, i ∈
[
0, 12
)
and j ∈
(
1
2 , 1
]
. According to (24), the value of marginal utility of
consumption is equalized across regions. However, given the home bias in consump-
tion, even if the law of one price holds, the purchasing power parity does not. As a
consequence, consumption can be different across both regions and areas.
By properly integrating this equation we obtain:
Cit
−σ
PCi,t
=
C∗H,t
−σ
EiH,tP ∗H,t
i ∈
[
0,
1
2
)
Cit
−σ
PCi,t
=
C∗F,t
−σ
EiF,tP ∗F,t
i ∈
(
1
2
, 1
]
C∗H,t
−σ
P ∗H,t
=
C∗F,t
−σ
EHF,tP ∗F,t
(25)
for all i, where Eij,t stands for the nominal exchange rate of region j currency to region
i currency8. Here C∗H,t ≡
[
2
∫ 1
2
0 C
i
t
−σ(1−η)
di
] −1
σ(1−η)
, C∗F,t ≡
[
2
∫ 1
1
2
Cjt
−σ(1−η)
dj
] −1
σ(1−η)
,
P ∗H,t ≡
[
2
∫ 1
2
0
(EHj,tPCj ,t)(1−η) dj] 1(1−η) and P ∗F,t ≡ [2 ∫ 11
2
PCj ,t
(1−η)dj
] 1
(1−η)
.
Regarding conditions (25), notice the following. Within area F , there is always a
common currency, independently of the policy regime. Thus, EFi,t = 1 for all i ∈ [12 , 1].
Conversely within area H, EHi,t = 1 for all i ∈ [0, 12) only under regime B when there
is a common currency and the exchange rates are fixed. Finally, in general, EHF,t is
floating under both regimes A and B. As shown in the appendix, it follows from to
(25) and (24) that:
Pi,t
PCi,t
=
[
γs + (γb − γs)
(
C∗H,t
Cit
)−σ(1−η)
+ (1− γb)
(
C∗F,t
Cit
)−σ(1−η)] 11−η
(26)
for i ∈
[
0, 12
)
and where γs ≡ 1αs and γb ≡
−αb
1−2αb . A corresponding condition can be
retrieved for area F :
Pi,t
PCi,t
=
[
γs + (γb − γs)
(
C∗F,t
Cit
)−σ(1−η)
+ (1− γb)
(
C∗H,t
Cit
)−σ(1−η)] 11−η
(27)
8... and EHj,t stands for the nominal exchange rate of region j currency to a common unit of account of
area H.
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for all i ∈
(
1
2 , 1
]
.
At the same time, (6) and (7) can be log-linearized as:
pˆi,t − pˆic,t = − (αb − αs) sˆiH,t − (1− αb) sˆiF,t i ∈
[
0,
1
2
)
(28)
pˆi,t − pˆic,t = − (αb − αs) sˆiF,t − (1− αb) sˆiH,t i ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
(29)
where sˆiH,t ≡ eiH,t + pˆH,t − pˆi,t and sˆiF,t ≡ eiF,t + pˆF,t − pˆi,t denote the terms of trade
of a small open economy i and areas H and F respectively9 and where cˆH,t ≡ 2
∫ 1
2
0 cˆ
j
tdj
and cˆF,t ≡ 2
∫ 1
1
2
cˆjtdj
10. By combining (6) and (7) with (28) and (29) and using (25) :
sˆiH,t = − σ
αs
(cˆH,t − cˆit) i ∈
[
0,
1
2
)
sˆiF,t = − σ
αs
(cˆF,t − cˆit) i ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
(30)
Moreover, by properly integrating the log-linear approximation of (26) and (28), it is
easy to show that:
sˆHF,t = −σ
(
1
2αb − 1
)
(cˆF,t − cˆH,t) (31)
where sˆHF,t ≡ eˆHF,t + pˆF,t − pˆH,t stands for the terms of trade between area F and
area H. According to (31), in equilibrium a rise in the terms trade of the two areas
reduces their relative consumption ratio as long as αb > 1 − αb11. A terms of trade
worsening12 makes home consumers substitute the goods produced in area F with
the goods produced in area H and increase their overall consumption because they
relatively prefer the bundle produced in their own area. Notice that the impact of an
improvement on the terms of trade on consumption differentials depends critically on
the household relative risk adversion (or the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of consumption) σ. The higher is σ, the lower is the difference in average
consumption across areas associated with a movement in the terms of trade. More risk
adverse households are more willing to share risk across different states of the world (or
less willing to shift consumption across periods). Finally, by taking (30) in differences,
it follows:
∆eiH,t + piH,t − pii,t = −σγs(∆cˆH,t −∆cˆit) i ∈
[
0,
1
2
)
(32)
piF,t − pii,t = −σγs(∆cˆF,t −∆cˆit) i ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
(33)
Equation (33), and in regime B also equation (32), can be interpreted as a constraint
imposed by the adoption of a common currency according to which, in response to
9...namely the average price of the goods produced in the small open economy i relative to the average
price of the goods produced in areas H and F . With a notational abuse pˆF,t indicates the log-deviation of
the average price in area F expressed in terms of the common currency of that area. Similar interpretation
applies to pˆH,t.
10We will use this as a general notation. For a given variable xˆt, xˆH,t ≡ 2
∫ 1
2
0
xˆjtdj and xˆF,t ≡ 2
∫ 1
1
2
xˆjtdj.
11That is αb >
1
2 as previously assumed.
12...namely an increase of sˆHF,t.
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asymmetric shocks, the terms of trade cannot adjust instantaneously because of the
sluggish price adjustment and the fixed exchange rates. Conversely under regime A in
area H, when there is monetary autonomy, the fluctuations of the nominal exchange
rates assure that condition (32) is always satisfied.
3.1 IS curve
Given (18) and (25), we can recover the following condition for area F :
1
1 + rF,t
= βEt
{(
C∗F,t+1
C∗F,t
)−σ
Π∗ −1F,t+1
}
(34)
where 11+rF,t = Et{Qit,t+1}. When markets are complete, the expected value of the
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of private consumption, namely the price
of a riskless portfolio, equalizes the price of the riskless bond, being rF,t the nominal
interest rate. The analogue of (34) for area H is
1
1 + rit
= βEt
{(
Cit+1
Cit
)−σ
Π−1
Ci,t+1
}
(35)
under regime A and:
1
1 + rH,t
= βEt
{(
C∗H,t+1
C∗H,t
)−σ
Π∗ −1H,t+1
}
(36)
otherwise. The log-linear approximation of conditions (34), (35) and (36) leads to:
rF,t − ρ = Et{piF,t+1} − σEt{∆cˆF,t+1 + (1− γb)(∆cˆH,t+1 −∆cˆF,t+1)} (37)
rit − ρ = Et{pii,t+1} − σEt{∆cˆit+1 + (γb − γs)(∆cˆH,t+1 −∆cˆit+1)
+(1− γb)(∆cˆF,t+1 −∆cˆit+1)} (38)
rH,t − ρ = Et{piH,t+1} − σEt{∆cˆH,t+1 + (1− γb)(∆cˆF,t+1 −∆cˆH,t+1)} (39)
where ρ ≡ −log(β). Conditions (37), (38) and (39) are the so called IS curves. Notice
that under regime A, rit can be different across the regions in area H being national
central banks independent in their policy decisions. Conversely under regime B, rit =
rH,t for all i, being the nominal interest of area H set by the common central bank of
the monetary union.
3.2 Aggregate demand
In each region i of area H the demand for a specific good, yt(h
i), is determined by the
demand of home and foreign consumers namely:
yit(h) = c
i
i,t(h) +
∫ 1
2
0
cji,t(h)dj +
∫ 1
1
2
cji,t(h)dj (40)
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for all i ∈
[
0, 12
)
. Given (8), condition (40) can be read as:
Y it = αs
(
Pi,t
PCi,t
)−η
Ct+2(αb−αs)
∫ 1
2
0
(
Pi,t
PCj ,t
)−η
Cjt dj+2(1−αb)
∫ 1
1
2
(
Pi,t
PCj ,t
)−η
Cjt dj
(41)
with Y it ≡
[∫ 1
0 y
i
t(h)
ε−1
ε dh
] ε
ε−1
Because of (24), the aggregate demand for region i can
be written as:
Y it =
(
Pi,t
PCi,t
)−η [
αsC
i
t + (αb − αs)CitσηCH,t + (1− αb)CitσηCF,t
]
(42)
with:
CH,t ≡ 2
∫ 1
2
0
Cjt
1−ση
dj CF,t ≡ 2
∫ 1
1
2
Cjt
1−ση
dj (43)
for all i ∈
[
0, 12
)
. A symmetric condition can be stated for all i ∈
(
1
2 , 1
]
, namely:
Y it =
(
Pi,t
PCi,t
)−η [
αsC
i
t + (αb − αs)CitσηCF,t + (1− αb)CitσηCH,t
]
(44)
It is easy to show that the first order approximation of (42) and (44) corresponds to:
yˆit = cˆ
i
t + (δb − δs)(cˆH,t − cˆit) + (1− δb)(cˆF,t − cˆit) i ∈
[
0,
1
2
)
(45)
yˆit = cˆ
i
t + (δb − δs)(cˆF,t − cˆit) + (1− δb)(cˆH,t − cˆit) i ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
(46)
where δs ≡ γsησ + αs(1 − ησ) and δb ≡ γbησ + αb(1 − ησ). According to (45), the
aggregate demand of goods produced in region i depends directly on the terms of trade
(through (30)). Any terms of trade improvement13 between region i and areas H or F
switches the expenditure of both home and foreign households toward foreign goods.
Aggregating (45) and (46), we obtain:
yˆH,t = cˆH,t + (1− δb)(cˆF,t − cˆH,t) i ∈
[
0,
1
2
)
(47)
yˆF,t = cˆF,t + (1− δb)(cˆH,t − cˆF,t) i ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
(48)
3.3 Aggregate supply
Given condition (23), the optimal price is determined as:
p˜t(h
i)
Pi,t
=
Kit
F it
(49)
13namely a decrease of sˆiH,t or sˆiF,t.
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with:
Kit ≡
∞∑
s=0
(βθ)sEt
[
Cit+s
−σ
Y it+s
(
Pi,t+s
Pi,t
)ε Pi,t+s
PCi,t+s
ε
ε− 1MCi,t+s
]
(50)
F it ≡
∞∑
s=0
(βθ)sEt
Cit+s−σY it+s
(
P ii,t+s
P it
)ε−1
Pi,t+s
PCi,t+s
 (51)
which can be read as:
Kit = C
i
t
−σ
Y ii,t
Pi,t
PCi,t
ε
ε− 1MCi,t + βθEt
{
Πεi,t+sK
i
t+1
}
(52)
F it = C
i
t
−σ
Y it
Pi,t
PCi,t
+ βθEt
{
Πε−1i,t+1F
i
t+1
}
(53)
where Πi,t ≡ Pi,tPi,t−1 . Following Benigno and Woodford (2005), from (49) and (21) we
can retrieve the next conditions:
1− θΠε−1i,t
1− θ =
(
F it
Kit
)ε−1
(54)
Zit = θZ
i
t−1Π
ε
i,t + (1− θ)
(
1− θΠε−1i,t
1− θ
) ε
ε−1
(55)
By the log-linear approximation of (17) (50) (51) and (55):
pii,t = λm̂c
i
t + βEt{pii,t+1} (56)
with λ ≡ (1−θ)(1−βθ)θ and where:
m̂cit =
(
wˆit − pˆic,t
)− (pˆi,t − pˆic,t)− aˆit (57)
for all t and i. Condition (56) is the New Keynesian Phillips Curve which results from
the Calvo mechanism. As usual, current domestic inflation depends on the expectation
on future domestic inflation and the current real marginal cost of producing goods.
Being the economy open in equilibrium this cost is determined by the real wage, which
is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, the
labour productivity and the product price index relative to the consumption price
index (26) and (27). By substituting(28) and log-linear approximation of (26) we
obtain:
m̂cit = ϕyˆ
i
t + σcˆ
i
t + (αb − αs)sˆiH,t + (1− αb)sˆiF,t − (1 + ϕ)aˆit + µˆit
= ϕyˆit + σcˆ
i
t + σ
[
(γb − γs) (cˆH,t − cˆit) + (1− γb) (cˆF,t − cˆit)
]− (1 + ϕ)aˆit + µˆit
(58)
for all i ∈ [0, 12). According to (58), an improvement of the terms of trade of region
i14 lowers firms’ real marginal costs. Given (58), we can rewrite condition (56) for
14namely a decrease of sˆiH,t or sˆiF,t.
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i ∈ [0, 12) and its symmetric condition for i ∈ [12 , 1] as:
pii,t = λ
[
ϕyˆit + σ
(
γscˆ
i
t + (γb − γs) cˆH,t + (1− γb) cˆF,t
)− (1 + ϕ)aˆit + µˆit]+ βEt{pii,t+1}
(59)
pii,t = λ
[
ϕyˆit + σ
(
γscˆ
i
t + (γb − γs) cˆF,t + (1− γb) cˆH,t
)− (1 + ϕ)aˆit + µˆit]+ βEt{pii,t+1}
(60)
Under regime A the rational expectation stochastic equilibrium is characterized by
(38), (45) and (59) for all i ∈ [0, 12) and by (33), (37), (46) and (60) for all i ∈ [12 , 1],
while under regime B by (32), (39), (45) and (59) for all i ∈ [0, 12) and by (33), (37),
(46) and (60) for all i ∈ [12 , 1].
It remains to determine to determine the optimal monetary policy.
4 Optimal monetary policy problems
As anticipated in the introduction, the main objective of this paper is to compare
in terms of welfare costs and benefits of a monetary union in a fully new-keynesian
micro-founded model. For this purpose we consider two policy regimes. Under regime
A, while there is a common currency in area F , countries in area H retain their own
central banks; by contrast under regime B, there are two monetary unions, one in the
area F and the other in the area H. Independently of the policy regimes we assume
that all monetary authorities (the central banks of the monetary unions and those of
the small open economies) are benevolent, take as given other policy makers’ choices
and can commit credibly to past and future promises15. These hypotheses allow to
find the Nash equilibrium policies by using the linear quadratic approach pioneered
by Benigno and Woodford (2005) and Benigno and Woodford (2006). Thanks to the
optimal policies, it is possible to quantify the difference in welfare for the households
of area H across the two policy regimes and to identify which regime is preferable
depending on the parameters of the model.
The linear quadratic approach is implemented as follows16. First the non-linear
optimal policy problems are specified. Second, the zero inflation deterministic steady
state of these problems is determined. Then, a purely quadratic approximation to
the objectives for both the small open economy and the monetary unions authorities
employing the second order approximation of the structural equations are retrieved. Fi-
nally the optimal policies can be found by maximizing these quadratic approximations
subject to the equilibrium conditions approximated to the first order.
4.1 The deterministic steady state
The steady state level of output is determined by a constant and generic labour subsidy
τ . We assume τ equal across countries and across regimes. As shown in the appendix,
under these assumptions, for any τ there exists a symmetric deterministic steady state
15In other words policies are supposed optimal from the timeless perspective.
16For more specific details on the non-linear optimal policy problem, on the zero inflation steady state and
on the quadratic approximation, see the appendix.
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at which zero inflation is a Nash equilibrium policy for all policy makers in areas H and
F under both regimes A and B. Thus, the equilibrium equations and the objectives of
the policy makers are approximated around the following steady state:
Y = (1− τ˜)− 1σ+ϕ (61)
C = Y (62)
F = K =
Y C−σ
1− θ =
Y ϕ+1(1− τ˜)
1− θ (63)
ΠH = ΠF = 1 Z = 1 (64)
where
τ˜ ≡ 1− (1− τ)(1 + µ) ε
ε− 1
Allowing for different level of labor subsidies enable us to emphasize two special
cases of interest. In particular, as clarified below it is possible to identify the steady
state levels of domestic output considered efficient from the viewpoint of both the
small open economy authorities and the central banks of the monetary union. Given
their different incentives, at the steady state these policy makers consider efficient two
different levels of domestic output. As a consequence, they have different ”perceptions”
of the steady state distortion. As it will be made clear in the next sections, this same
divergence is crucial in explaining the different monetary policies over the business
cycle.
In the case of the small open economy i, the efficient level of steady state output
can be retrieved by maximizing:
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
Cit
1−σ
1− σ −
1
ϕ+ 1
(
Y it
Ait
)ϕ+1]
with respect to Cit and Y
i
t , subject to (42) where Pi,t/PCi,t are determined consistently
with (26), while C∗H,t, C
∗
F,t, CH,t and CF,t are taken as given. According to the first
order conditions at the symmetric deterministic steady state:
Ys = δ
−1
σ+ϕ
s (65)
where, as above, δs ≡ γsησ + αs(1 − ησ) which is always greater than 1 as long as
ση > 1. The optimal labour subsidy that allows to implement this allocation is given
by:
τ˜s = 1− δs (66)
Thus, the small open policy makers would not like to reach the Pareto efficient steady
state at which the monopolistic distortions are exactly eliminated17. They would rather
prefer a lower level of steady state production. This is because financial markets are
complete and consumption is highly correlated across regions. So domestic utility rises
17The Pareto efficient allocation corresponds to Y = 1 which can be achieved by setting τ˜ = 0.
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if domestic production falls (relative to other countries’ production) and the terms of
trade improve18. Indeed even if a terms of trade improvement causes consumption to
drop, its contraction is more than compensated in terms of welfare by the correspond-
ing increase in leisure. In other words, by manipulating the terms of trade in their
favor small open economy policy makers (as those of the monetary union) attempt to
externalize labour effort to other countries’ workers.
Notice that in the case of the small open economy the incentive to outsource pro-
duction is stronger the higher is δs which depends positively on η, the elasticity of
substitution between home and foreign goods, σ, the inverse of the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution of consumption and 1 − αs the degree of openness of the small
country. Indeed the higher are η and σ, the more home households are inclined to sub-
stitute consumption of the domestic goods with that of foreign goods (i.e. the higher
is the switching effect), and then the less the overall consumption falls because of the
reduction in the domestic production.
In the case of the policy maker of the monetary union, the desired steady state
output can be determined by maximizing:
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[∫ 1
2
0
(
Cit
1−σ
1− σ −
1
ϕ+ 1
(
Y it
Ait
)ϕ+1)
di
]
(67)
with respect to Cit and Y
i
t for all i ∈ [0, 1] subject to:
Pi,t
PCi,t
=
(1− τ˜)
Ait
ϕ+1
Y it
ϕ
Cit
−σ (68)
for all i ∈ [12 , 1], (42) and (44) and where Pi,t/PCi,t, CH,t and CF,t are determined
according to (26), (27) and (43)19. F rom the first order conditions of this problem it
follows that at the symmetric steady state:
Yb =
[
1− (1− δb)(σ + ϕ)
(δbϕ+ γbσ)
] −1
σ+ϕ
(69)
This allocation can be achieved by setting the labour subsidy:
τ˜b =
(1− δb)(σ + ϕ)
(δbϕ+ γbσ)
(70)
where δb ≡ γbησ + αb(1 − ησ) which is always greater than 1 as long as ση > 1.
According to these conditions, even in the case of the big economy, the policy makers
seek to improve the terms of trade by reducing domestic production with respect to
what would be Pareto efficient. However by the comparing (69) and (65), it can be
shown that under reasonable calibrations:
1 > Yb > Ys (71)
18And in fact the optimal labour subsidy is set equal to 1 − δs, a parameter related with the average
elasticity of the domestic goods demand with respect to the terms of trade of the small open economy. As
made clear by (45) and (59), two are the relevant terms of trade from the small open economy point of view:
those of the small open economy and areas H and F .
19Implicitly (68) states that the policy maker of area H takes as given the strategy τ˜ chosen by a symmetric
policy maker in area F .
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Thus, at the symmetric steady state, the policy maker of the monetary union would
choose a level of domestic output higher than that considered efficient by the small open
economy authorities. The reasons for this outcome are threefold. First of all, bigger
countries are less open. Then the incentive of their policy makers to improve the
terms of trade is weaker. Secondly, big economy authorities realize to hold monopoly
power only on the terms of trade across areas20 and they internalize the external effects
produced within the monetary union. Finally they take into account the impact of their
policies on the foreign economy. In particular they are aware that a terms of trade
improvement causes an increase in foreign production thanks to the boost in foreign
good demand21. So they recognize that a lower labor tax rate (lower than that set
by the small open economy policy maker which take as given foreign output) allows
to reach the same desired level of domestic/foreign output ratio. All these motives
contribute to weaken the desire of influencing their terms of trade.
Summing up, the difference in size between small and big countries affects the
incentives of their policy makers and thus the desired steady state level of domestic
output. Specifically in the case of the monetary union this level is closer to Pareto
efficiency than in the case of the small open economy. As explained in the next sections,
these different ”perceptions” in the steady state distortion are key even for optimal
policy decisions over the business cycle.
4.2 The case of a closed economy
In this section we step behind doing a small digression to explain how and why the
steady state distortion influences optimal monetary policy decisions in a closed econ-
omy22. To this end consider the approximation of objective of the small open economy
policy maker23 in the limiting case of αs = αb = 1:
−1
2
Y ϕ+1
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
$c,1pi
2
t +$c,2(y˜
c
t )
2 − 2$c,3c˜ct y˜ct +$c,4(c˜ct)2
]
+ t.i.p.
(72)
with:
$c,1 ≡ [1− ζc(ϕ+ 1)] ε
λ
$c,2 ≡ [1− ζc(ϕ+ 1)]ϕ
$c,3 ≡ ζcσ
$c,4 ≡
[
(1− τ˜)(σ − 1) + ζcσ2 + (1− ζcϕ)
]
ζc ≡ τ˜
ϕ+ σ
20This explains the dependence of τ˜b on 1−δb, a parameter that governs the elasticity of aggregate demand
for the domestic goods to the terms of trade across areas.
21...at least under flexible prices which is the relevant case for the steady state analysis.
22On this topic the seminal contributions have been those of Benigno and Woodford (2005) and Benigno
and Woodford (2006).
23See the appendix.
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and where t.i.p. stands for terms independent of policy. (72) expresses the utility
losses (approximated up to second order) as function of inflation and the welfare-
relevant consumption and output gap. In fact x˜ct ≡ xˆt − xˆct denotes the deviations of
xt from the target of monetary authority when the economy is closed. This target can
be retrieved by equations (123) -(123) under the assumption that αs = αb = 1 and
satisfies the next conditions:
[1− ζc(ϕ+ 1)] (m̂rsct − m̂rt
c
t) = ζc(ϕ+ 1)µˆt (73)
yˆct = cˆ
c
t (74)
with
m̂rsct − m̂rt
c
t = ϕyˆ
c
t + σcˆ
c
t − (ϕ+ 1)aˆt
m̂rsct and m̂rt
c
t represent the log-deviation of the marginal rate of substitution and
of the marginal rate of transformation between consumption and output.
Thanks to conditions (73) and (74) we can achieve the following conclusions about
the goals of the monetary authority:
1. When the steady state is efficient (i.e. τ˜ = 0 and ζc = 0 ), we go back to the
standard result of closed economy literature24 for which the central bank would
like to close the gap between m̂rsct and m̂rt
c
t because in this way it reaches the
first best allocation.
2. Under technological shocks, the monetary authority still wishes to close that gap
even if the steady state is inefficient (i.e. ζc 6= 0). Indeed in that case she cannot
influence the distortions due to the steady state inefficiency. Therefore she seeks
to replicate the fluctuations of the first best allocation. In other words, under
technological shocks, the target of the monetary authority is not affected by the
steady state inefficiency because the flexible price allocation is constrain efficient.
3. Conversely under mark up shocks the monetary authority is willing to bear a dif-
ference between m̂rsct and m̂rt
c
t , where this difference depends on the mark up
shocks themselves and on the size of the steady state distortion. In particular if
the steady state output is inefficiently high (i.e. ζc > 0), the monetary authority
wants output to negatively comove with these shocks. As a result, the central
bank would focus more on inflation than output stabilization (more than what
would do if the steady state were efficient) given that a positive mark up shock
tends to reduce output. Viceversa25 an inefficient low level of steady state out-
put (i.e. ζc < 0) would imply a monetary policy that weighs more output than
inflation stabilization.
At a first glance the third result is quite puzzling: mark up shocks generate inefficient
fluctuations in consumption and output. Intuitively we could expect that then the
central bank would like to completely stabilize output and consumption (as in fact
it is willing to do when the steady state is efficient). Instead, it wants output and
consumption to react to these shocks. Why? The underling reason can be understood
24See among others Gal´ı (2008) and Woodford (2003).
25under the parametric restriction: τ˜ < σ+ϕϕ+1 .
17
by considering condition (17) (in its closed economy case counterpart), when prices are
flexible and there are no shocks to technology:
E
{
Wt
Pt
}
= E
{
Y ϕ+σt
}
E {(1 + µt)}+ Cov
{
Y ϕ+σt (1 + µt)
}
(75)
According to (75), the lower is the covariance between mark up shocks and output,
the higher is the average per-period output for a given level of per-period real wage.
Indeed, if output fluctuates more in response to mark up shocks - which corresponds
to a decrease in the covariance between output and the mark up shocks themselves -
consumers have to rise on average their labour effort in order to get the same real wage.
Then if output is on average inefficiently low because of the steady state distortion,
allowing for negative comovements between output and mark up shocks have beneficial
effects because it shifts downward the average supply curve engendering an efficient
increase in the average level of per-period output.
4.3 The case of the small open economy
As shown in the appendix, the objective of the small open economy policy maker of
country i in area H can be approximated up to the second order as:
−1
2
Y ϕ+1
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
$s,1(pii,t)
2 +$s,2(y˜
i,s
t )
2 − 2$s,3(c˜i,st y˜i,st ) +$s,4(c˜i,st )2
]
+ t.i.p.
(76)
where
$s,1 ≡ [1− ζs(ϕ+ 1)] ε
λ
$s,2 ≡ [1− ζs(ϕ+ 1)]ϕ
$s,3 ≡ ζsγsσ
$s,4 ≡ (1− τ˜)(σ − 1) + ζsγ2sσ2 + (1− ζsϕ)(δs + ω1)
ζs ≡ δs − (1− τ˜)
δsϕ+ γsσ
ω1 is properly defined in the appendix and x˜
i,s
t ≡ xˆit − xˆi,st . xˆi,st indicates the
target of the small open economy monetary authority which is determined by (123)26.
Notice that in the case of the small open economy the t.i.p., the terms independent of
monetary policy, include the aggregate variables of both areas H and F .
The welfare approximation in (76) contains the output gap, the consumption gap
and inflation like in a closed economy. What is crucially different are the weights
attached to these variables and the target that the authority would like to implement.
This divergence with respect to the closed economy case is rationalized again by the
26This target can be interpreted as the constrained efficient allocation from the small open economy
viewpoint, namely the allocation that would be chosen by a small open economy policy maker that has as
objective the maximization of (76) subject exclusively to constraint (45).
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desire of open economy policy makers to manipulate the terms of trade in their favour.
In fact, on the one hand, this incentive works even over the business cycle and gives
reason, for instance, for the higher weight attributed to consumption gap volatility:
policy makers realize that fluctuations in consumption are associated with fluctuations
in the terms of trade. On the other hand, this same incentive explains why from the
small open economy policy makers viewpoint, the steady state is efficient as long as
Y = Ys - which implies τ˜ = τ˜s and thus ζs = 0 - and not when Y = Yc = 1 as in
a closed economy. This has clear consequences for the weights in (76) (given that ζs
depends critically on the difference between τ˜ and τ˜s) and for channels through which
openness modifies the conduct of small open economy central banks.
To better investigate these channels consider the subsequent conditions:
[1− ζs(ϕ+ 1)](m̂rssH,t − m̂rt
s
H,t) = ζs(ϕ+ 1)µˆH,t + κssˆ
s
HF,t (77)
yˆsH,t = cˆ
s
H,t +
(1− δb)(2αb − 1)
σ
sˆsHF,t (78)
where
m̂rssH,t − m̂rt
s
H,t = ϕyˆ
s
H,t + σcˆ
s
H,t − (ϕ+ 1)aˆH,t + σ(1− γb)(cˆF,t − cˆsH,t)
sˆsHF,t = −
σ
2αb − 1(cˆF,t − cˆ
s
H,t)
κs ≡ (2αb − 1)
σδs
[(1− ζsϕ)(σ(1− γb)δs − ω2) + ζsγs((1− δb)− ση(1− γb))]
Conditions (77) and (78) are recovered by properly rearranging and integrating
(122), the equations determining the target27 of the small open economy authority.
The comparison with their akin of the closed economy, namely (73) and (74), allows
to stress the following findings:
1 As indicated by the terms κssˆHF,t, even when the steady state is efficient from the
small open economy viewpoint (i.e. ζs = 0), in general, the target does not
coincide with the flexible price allocation. This is because small country policy
makers try to manipulate their terms of trade even over the business cycle28.
2 The target reacts to domestic mark up shocks if and only if there is a steady state
inefficiency from the small open economy perspective (i.e. ζs 6= 0).
This second result confirms our intuition that from the small country viewpoint the
welfare relevant distortion is determined by the difference between τ˜ , the actual steady
state labour subsidy, and τ˜s = 1− δs, its desired level (which in turn governs the value
of ζs). As long as τ˜ 6= τ˜s, the small open policy maker considers inefficient the aver-
age per-period wedge between the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and labour and its marginal rate of transformation. In particular, under the baseline
calibration the per-period output is regarded as inefficiently high (i.e τ˜ > 1 − δs and
ζs > 0). Indeed, once the aggregate world variables are taken as given, at the margin
27under the assumption that the target is implemented which ensures that
∫ 1
2
0
xˆi,st di = xˆH,t.
28Notice that not surprisingly if αb = 1 then κb = 0. In fact if the area is closed, then on average the
effects due to the terms of trade externality disappear.
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an increase in leisure rises utility by more than an increase in consumption. This gen-
erates a motive for the central banks of the small open economies to seek to squeeze
the average per-period output and to modify their inflation output trade-off. In fact,
by focusing more on output than on inflation stabilization29 in response to mark up
shocks, these authorities can induce domestic households to work more. In this way
per-period domestic output, which is perceived as too high, can fall.
The timelessly optimal monetary policy can be retrieved by maximizing (76) with
respect to y˜i,st , c˜
i,s
t and pii,t subject to the following sequence of constraints:
y˜it = δsc˜
i
t (79)
pii,t = λ
[
ϕy˜i,st + σγsc˜
i,s
t
]
+ λυi,st + βEt{pii,t+1} (80)
for all t where:
υi,st = ϕyˆ
i,s
t + σγscˆ
i,s
t + σ (γb − γs) cˆH,t + σ (1− γb) cˆF,t − (1 + ϕ)aˆit + µˆit.
4.4 The case of the monetary union
As shown in the appendix, if there is a monetary union in area H, the objective of the
monetary policy maker can be approximated in a purely quadratic way as:
−1
2
Y ϕ+1
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
$b,1(piH,t)
2 +$b,2(y˜
b
H,t)
2 + 2$b,3c˜
b
H,ty˜
b
H,t + 2$b,4c˜
b
F,ty˜
b
H,t +$b,5(y˜
b
F,t)
2
+2$b,6c˜
b
F,ty˜
b
F,t + 2$b,7c˜
b
H,ty˜
b
F,t +$b,8(c˜
b
F,t)
2 +$b,9(c˜
b
H,t)
2 + 2$b,10c˜
b
H,tc˜
b
F,t
]
+ t.i.p.
(81)
where
$b,1 ≡ [1− ζb(ϕ+ 1)] ε
λ
$b,2 ≡ [1− ζb(ϕ+ 1)]ϕ
$b,3 ≡ −ζbσγb
$b,4 ≡ −ζbσ (1− γb)
$b,5 ≡ −(ξ − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)ϕ
$b,6 ≡ −(ξ − ζb)σγb
$b,7 ≡ (ξ − ζb)σ (1− γb)
29 as long as δsϕ+γsσϕ+1 > δs − (1− τ˜).
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$b,8 ≡ −(1− ζb(ϕ+ 1))(1− δb)− (ξ − ζb)ϕδb + ζbσ2(1− γb)2 + (1− ζbϕ)ησ2γb(1− γb)
$b,9 ≡ (σ − 1)(1− τ˜) + (1− ζb(ϕ+ 1))δb − (ξ − ζb)ϕ(1− δb)− (1− ζbϕ)ησ2γb(1− γb)
+ζbσ
2γ2b + (ξ − ζb)σ2 (1− γb)2
$b,10 ≡ (1− ζbϕ)ησ2γb(1− γb) + ζbσ2γb(1− γb) + (ξ − ζb)σ2 (1− γb) γb
ζb ≡ 1
2
τ˜
σ + ϕ
− δb − 1 + (1/2)τ˜
(1− 2γb)σ + (1− 2δb)ϕ
ξ ≡ τ˜
σ + ϕ
and x˜bt ≡ xˆt − xˆbt . xˆbt denotes the target of the monetary union central bank which
can be determined from (47)-(48) and (139)-(143)30. In addition t.i.p., the terms
independent of policy, include the state contingent path of piF,t decided by the policy
maker of the monetary union in area F and the differentials between country specific
and average union variables31.
To grasp some insights the incentives driving the optimal monetary policy of the
monetary union consider the following ”targeting” condition:
[1− ζb(ϕ+ 1)](m̂rsbH,t − m̂rt
b
H,t)− (ξ − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)(m̂rsbF,t − m̂rt
b
F,t) =
ζb(ϕ+ 1)µˆH,t + (ξ − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)µˆF,t + κbsˆbHF,t (82)
where:
m̂rsbH,t − m̂rt
b
H,t = ϕyˆ
b
H,t + σcˆ
b
H,t − (ϕ+ 1)aˆH,t + σ(1− γb)(cˆbF,t − cˆbH,t)
m̂rsbF,t − m̂rt
b
F,t = ϕyˆ
b
F,t + σcˆ
b
F,t − (ϕ+ 1)aˆF,t + σ(1− γb)(cˆbF,t − cˆbF,t)
κb ≡ (2αb − 1)σ−1(1− ζb [(ϕ+ σ))((1− δb)− σ(1− γb))− (ξ − ζb)(ϕ+ σ)(δb − σγb)]
Thus m̂rsbH,t and m̂rt
b
H,t (as m̂rs
b
F,t and m̂rt
b
F,t) stand for the average marginal rate
of substitution and transformation between consumption and output in area H (in area
F ). Like its analogue (77), condition (82) is derived from the equations that determine
the target of the monetary union policy makers, namely (47)-(48) and (139)-(143).
Condition (82) leads to the next conclusions:
1 Differently from the case of the small open economy, the common central bank in
area H wants to stabilize a weighted average between the gap between m̂rsbH,t and
m̂rt
b
H,t in area H and this same gap in area F . In fact, the monetary authority
of the currency area takes into account how its decisions affect the demand and
the supply of foreign goods and the related feedback effects on its own economy.
2 However the central bank of the monetary union attaches different weights to home
and foreign variables.
30namely the constraint efficient allocation from the perspective of the policy maker of area H. This
allocation corresponds to the allocation chosen by a policy maker that maximizes (81) subject exclusively to
constraints (47) and (48). See the appendix.
31Indeed, by choosing the average union inflation, the common central bank can influence only the average
union performance. However, these terms have to be taken into account for the welfare evaluation.
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3 Moreover that authority balances the need to stabilize the gaps between the marginal
rates of substitution and transformation with a twofold desire: on the one hand,
as indicated by the term κb, it wants to manipulate the terms of trade in its favor
over the business cycles; on the other hand, in the presence of domestic mark up
shocks, it seeks to influence the average per-period levels of both domestic and
foreign output.
These features are direct consequence of the desire to improve the terms of trade
already emphasized above. This incentive stems from a free riding problem. Under
the assumption of complete financial markets, consumption is highly correlated across
countries. Given that labour effort lowers utility, this risk sharing in consumption gen-
erates a conflict on where to produce output. Indeed, the higher is the substitutability
between home and foreign bundles, the more countries wish to outsource production
and squeeze domestic output relatively to foreign output. In this manner they can
reduce labour effort without decreasing too much consumption.
This mechanism gives reason of why the size of the economy shapes optimal mone-
tary policy decisions. In the limiting case in which the economy is small, the only way
monetary policy can lessen domestic/foreign relative output ratio is through a contrac-
tion of domestic production. In fact, the economic performance of a single small open
economy is irrelevant for aggregate output behavior. Conversely when the economy is
big, policy makers realize that their decisions can diminish the domestic/foreign per-
period output ratio through either a reduction of the domestic output or an increase of
the foreign one. As consequence, and as highlighted by condition (82), the target of the
monetary union central bank depends on foreign mark up shocks and attaches asym-
metric weights to domestic and foreign economic performances. In particular under
the baseline calibration, per-period foreign production is considered inefficiently low
even more than domestic one32. In other words, policy makers of the big economies
want households abroad to work more than consumers at home.
The optimal monetary policy problem of the common central bank in area H can
be formulated as maximizing (81) with respect to y˜bH,t, y˜
b
F,t, c˜
b
H,t, c˜
b
F,t and piH,t subject
to the following sequence of constraints:
y˜bH,t = c˜
b
H,t + (1− δb)(c˜bF,t − c˜bH,t)
y˜bF,t = c˜
b
F,t + (1− δb)(c˜bH,t − c˜bF,t)
piH,t = λ
[
ϕy˜bH,t + σ
(
c˜bH,t + (1− γb) (c˜bF,t − c˜bH,t)
)]
+ λυbH,t + βEt{piH,t+1}
piF,t = λ
[
ϕy˜bF,t + σ
(
c˜bF,t + (1− γb) (c˜bH,t − c˜bF,t)
)]
+ λυbF,t + βEt{piF,t+1}
for all t where
υ˜bt = ϕyˆ
b
H,t + σcˆ
b
H,t + σ (1− γb) (cˆbF,t − cˆbH,t)− (1 + ϕ)aˆH,t + µˆH,t
υ˜bF,t = ϕyˆ
b
F,t + σcˆ
b
F,t + σ (1− γb) (cˆbH,t − cˆbF,t)− (1 + ϕ)aˆF,t + µˆF,t
32Notice that in order to reach the efficient level of foreign output, the labour subsidy should be set equal
to τ˜ = − (1−δb)(σ+ϕ)((1−δb)ϕ+(1−γb)σ) , a level such that foreign labour is over-subsidized!
22
The solution to this problem allows to determine the average inflation in area H and
all the other area variables, given a state contingent path of the average inflation in
area F . A symmetric problem can be stated for the foreign area. Notice that once the
average union variables are determined, the region specific variables can be recovered
directly from the equilibrium conditions namely (32), (33), (45), (46), (59) and (60).
Moreover, under this formulation, the optimal monetary policy problem is independent
of whether there is either monetary autonomy among countries or a monetary union
in the other area.
5 Optimal monetary policies
The solution to the optimal policy problems of both the small open policy maker and
the central bank of the monetary union enable us to simulate the impulse responses to
a one percent decrease in home and foreign mark ups under regimes A and B. These
impulses responses are plotted in figures 1-2. The baseline calibration is listed in the
appendix and is in line with the literature33.
5.1 Dynamic Simulation
The impulse responses to a global negative mark up shock can be interpreted as follows.
As shown in figures 1 and 2, under optimal policies, given the fall in their marginal
costs, both home and foreign firms cut prices and expand output supply. Workers
increase consumption and reduce leisure. Monetary policies have then to trade off
between output and inflation stabilization. These patterns are common to both areas
and regimes. However, under regime A, consumption and output in area H increase
by less than in regime B, while deflation in area H and output in area F increase by
more. These differences are explained exclusively by the diverging conduct of policy
makers under the two policy regimes.
Regime B. Under regime B, when there are two currency unions, impulse responses
are symmetric across areas. Under the baseline calibration both domestic and foreign
per-period output are perceived as too low. However, the distortion in the foreign
production is considered relatively stronger (i.e. the desired steady state output ratio
YH
YF
< 1.). As consequence under global mark up shocks, monetary union policy makers
would like foreign output to fluctuate relatively more. In other words they attempt
to generate a positive covariance between mark up shocks and their terms of trade
in order to induce foreign consumers to rise their production by more than domestic
households. Obviously, in equilibrium none of the policy makers in area H and F
reaches her goal. Indeed given symmetry, home and foreign output perfectly commove
in such a way that their relative average per-period ratio is always equal to one.
Regime A. Under regime A, the conduct of the monetary policy makers in area
H is dissimilar from that in regime B in two respects. On the one hand, under the
baseline calibration, the per-period domestic output is too high from the small open
33See in particular Gal´ı and Monacelli (2007), Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) and Pappa (2004).
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economy perspective. As a result, when there is monetary independence, they are more
focused on output stabilization than the central bank of the monetary union. Indeed,
in response to a negative mark up shock, they seek to restrain output expansion and
allow for a higher deflation by increasing on average the nominal interest rate by more
than what the single central bank of the monetary union does in regime B. In this
way they push the economy in the direction of an improvement of the terms of trade
in their area. In fact being their economies small, these monetary authorities consider
what happens in the world economy as exogenous. Thus, they do not take into account
(as the monetary authority of a currency area does) how their joint action affects per-
period foreign production. Therefore they do not realize that boosting the negative
covariance between foreign production and mark up shocks can be beneficial: it induces
foreign workers to produce additional output that can be consumed even by domestic
households thanks to the consumption risk sharing.
Given the restrictive monetary policy in area H, the monetary authority of area F
restrains monetary policy as well, but not as much as the central banks of area H, al-
lowing for a terms of trade worsening. By doing so, she wants to oppose the restrictive
policies of the other area, because she finds an expansion of foreign output beneficial.
Nevertheless, she also wants to stabilize domestic price dynamics. Deflation response
in area F is similar across regimes, whereas output and consumption are influenced by
the restrictive policy of the policy makers in area H.
There is a crucial question that is still left open. When are the consumers of area
H better off? In regime A or in regime B? This question is addressed in the next
section.
6 Welfare evaluation
The analysis of the previous section reveals that, in the presence of mark up shocks,
there are potential welfare benefits from the adoption of a common currency. Moreover,
it makes clear which are the sources of these benefits: on the one hand the internal-
ization of the spillover effects generated within area H; on the other hand the gains
in monopoly power in controlling the terms of trade across areas. The household wel-
fare based criterion derived in (81) allows to quantify the welfare gains of being in a
currency area as average per-period losses expressed as a fraction of the steady state
consumption. The results are quite robust: under mark up shocks, even for relatively
low levels of the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign bundles, there are
welfare benefits of forming a monetary union. In the next sections we analyze how
these benefits vary according to the key parameters of the model.
The intertemporal and the intratemporal elasticities of substitution. Both the in-
tratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and foreign bundles, η, and the
relative risk adversion coefficient (the inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution
of consumption), σ, are crucial to determine the size of the welfare gains (or losses)
of abandoning monetary autonomy34. Indeed they influence directly the effects that
34This finding is actually consistent with the literature. See in particular Benigno and Benigno (2003),
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movements in the terms of trade produce on the demand of foreign goods. The higher
are η and σ35, the larger is the switching effect from domestic towards foreign goods,
the stronger is the increase in foreign production due to a terms of trade improvement
and the more domestic production (and leisure) decreases allowing home households
to reach a higher level of utility. Summing up, these parameters govern the real effects
of the beggar-thy-neighbour policies and therefore the benefits of policy coordination
that arise from being in a monetary union. Figure 3 plots how welfare benefits increase
in area H relatively to an increase of η and σ. η varies from 1 to 3, while σ varies
from 1 to 2.5. Within this range, these gains reach a maximum of 0.3 percentage of
the steady state consumption. However, for low levels η the adoption of a common
currency brings about welfare losses up to 0.1 percentage of steady state consumption.
The degree of home bias. The welfare benefits of a monetary union are due to
two main channels: the internalization of all the external effects produced within the
monetary union by the national authorities; the gains of monopoly power (due to the
bigger size of the area) on the terms of trade (and thus average output differentials)
across areas. A relevant question is which of these channels contributes more to explain
the welfare benefits themselves. For this reason, we investigate to what extent these
gains depend on the degree of home bias of area H, αb.
Figure 4 plots the welfare gains of being in the regime B for the consumers of area
H relatively to different degree of η (from 1 to 3) and αb (from 0.6 to 1) and shows the
following result. For low degree of η the welfare gains - which are actually losses - are
lower in a closed economy (i.e. αb = 1), whereas for high degree of η the converse is
true. This finding can be explained as follows. If η and αb are high, the main sources
of welfare gains is due to the elimination of the spillover effects within the union in
area H. Indeed if the area is very closed, the welfare benefits due to an increase in
control on the terms of trade across area and on average area output differential are not
important. However if η and αb are low the main gain in adopting the same currency
is due to the internalization of both the impact of its actions on the foreign area and
related feedback effects on the same area H.
In order to better disentangle these two sources of welfare gains, it would be useful
to allow for different elasticities of substitution between bundles produced in different
regions and in different areas. In this way, in fact, it would be possible to understand
how the welfare gains of forming a monetary union vary in response to a variation of a
parameter, the elasticity of substitution between bundles produced in different areas,
that affects exclusively exeternalities generated by the big economy on the terms of
trade across areas.
The correlation between region specific shocks. For the purpose of this paper, it is
important to check how welfare gains depend on the correlation between region specific
shocks. Indeed, this correlation is the key determinant of the costs due to the loss of an
Benigno and Benigno (2006) and Pappa (2004).
35The lower is the intertemporal elasticity of consumption, the higher is the incentive to smooth consump-
tion across periods. Thus, when there is a terms of trade improvement, consumers are more inclined to keep
the same level of overall consumption, buying more foreign goods or working more to substitute between the
present and future consumption.
25
independent instrument of policy that can suit specific country economic conditions.
Figure 5 plots the welfare gains of the consumers in area H relative to the elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign bundles η and to that ς1. Not surprisingly
according to that figure the lower is the correlation between regional shocks the lower
are the welfare benefits of adopting a common currency. In fact for small levels of η and
ς1 there are significant welfare losses across policy regimes up to 0.15 of the steady state
consumption. However for high level of η independently of the degree of correlation
between region specific shocks, the welfare gains of having the same currency are always
greater than 0.1 percent of the steady state consumption.
7 Conclusion
This paper has shown that, in the presence of mark up shocks, under plausible cal-
ibration there are welfare gains due to the adoption of a common currency. This
finding is obtained in a New Keynesian open economy framework in which forming a
monetary union entails a meaningful trade-off: on the one hand, because of nominal
rigidities, losing monetary independence implies the welfare costs of renouncing to a
policy instrument that can stabilize country-specific shocks; on the other hand, delegat-
ing the monetary policy to the monetary union’s central bank generates welfare gains
by improving the conduct of the national authorities. In a world constituted by two
economic areas as the one laid out in our basic setup, two are the main sources of this
improvement. The first is due to the internalization of the spillover effects produced by
autonomous authorities within the monetary union. The second is due by the gain in
monopoly power in controlling the terms of trade across areas and the feedback effects
of the policy maker decision.
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Baseline Calibration
σ−1 = 1/2 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the private goods;
η = 2 Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign private goods;
ϕ−1 = 1/3 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labor;
αs = 0.6 Degree of home bias for the bundle of the region;
αb = 0.8 Degree of home bias for the bundle of the area;
ε = 6 Elasticity of substitution among goods produced in the same region;
β = 0.99 Preferences discount factor;
SDva = 0.0071 Standard deviation of the white noise of the aggregate technological shocks;
SDvµ = 0.03 Standard deviation of the white noise of the aggregate markup shocks;
ac = 0.9 Autocorrelation of shocks;
τ˜ = −1 Steady state labour subsidy;
ς = 2 Ratio between the variance of the idiosyncratic innovation and the
variance of the aggregate innovation.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to a negative aggregate markup shock.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a negative aggregate markup shock.
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Welfare gains for the households of area H
η : elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign bundles
σ : relative risk adversion coeffi cient
Figure 3: Welfare gains for area H expressed as percentage of the steady state consumption.
32
Welfare gains for the households of area H
η : elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign bundles
αb : degree of home bias in the area
Figure 4: Welfare gains for area H expressed as percentage of the steady state consumption.
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Welfare gains for the households of area H
ς1 : cross-correlationη : elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign bundles
Figure 5: Welfare gains for area H expressed as percentage of the steady state consumption.
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A Retrieving condition (26)
Given the definitions of P ∗H,t and P
∗
F,t it is easy to show that:
EiH,tP ∗H,t = [αbPH,t1−η+(1−αb)PF,t1−η]
1
1−η EiF,tP ∗F,t = [αbPF,t1−η+(1−αb)PH,t1−η]
1
1−η
(83)
By (83):
EiH,tP ∗H,t
PH,t
=
[
αb + (1− αb)
(
PF,t
PH,t
)1−η] 11−η EiF,tP ∗F,t
PF,t
=
[
αb + (1− αb)
(
PH,t
PF,t
)1−η] 11−η
(84)
which jointly with (25) leads to:
(
C∗F,t
C∗H,t
)
=
αb
(
PF,t
PH,t
)1−η
+ (1− αb)
(1− αb)
(
PF,t
PH,t
)1−η
+ αb

− 1
σ(1−η)
(85)
Moreover thanks to (6):
Pi,t
PCi,t
=
[
1
αs
− αb − αs
αs
(
PH,t
PCi,t
)1−η
− (1− αb)
αs
(
PF,t
PCi,t
)1−η] 11−η
i ∈
[
0,
1
2
)
(86)
which can be read as:
Pi,t
PCi,t
=
 1
αs
− αb − αs
αs
(
PH,t
Ei,HP ∗H,t
)(1−η)(
C∗H,t
Cit
)−σ(1−η)
− (1− αb)
αs
(
PF,t
Ei,FP ∗F,t
)(1−η)(
C∗F,t
Cit
)−σ(1−η) 11−η
(87)
Finally by using (84) and (85) we can rewrite (86) as (26).
B Zero Inflation Deterministic Steady State
In this section we show that, given appropriate initial conditions, zero inflation is a
Nash equilibrium policy at the deterministic steady state under both regimes A and
B.
In the regime A the timelessly optimal policy problem of a monetary authority
of country i in the area H can be formulated as the maximization of the following
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Lagragian:
Li =
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
{Cit1−σ
1− σ −
1
ϕ+ 1
(
Y it Z
i
t
Ait
)ϕ+1
+ζs,i1,t
[
Y it −
(
Pi,t
PCi,t
)−η (
αsC
i
t + (αb − αs)CitσηCH,t + (1− αb)CitσηCF,t
)]
+ζs,i2,t
[
Kit −
(
Y it
Ait
)ϕ+1
Zit
ϕ
(1 + µit)(1− τ i)
ε
ε− 1
]
− ζs,i2,t−1θΠεi,tKit
+ζs,i3,t
[
F it − Y it Ci−σt
P it
PCi,t
]
− ζs,i3,t−1θΠ(ε−1)i,t F it
+ζs,i4,t
F it −Kit
(
1− θΠε−1i,t
1− θ
) 1
ε−1

+ζs,i5,t
Zit − θZit−1Πεi,t − (1− θ)
(
1− θΠε−1i,t
1− θ
) ε
ε−1
}
with respect to Cit , Y
i
t , Z
i
t , K
i
t , F
i
t and Πi,t and where Pi,t/PCi,t are determined
consistently with (26), while C∗H,t, C
∗
F,t, CH,t and CF,t are taken as given. Assume that
µjt = µ, A
j
t = A, τ
j = τ and Zjt = Πj,t = 1 for all j ∈ [0, 1] and t. Assume in addition
that Zi−1 = 1. Recalling that τ˜ = 1− (1− τ) (1+µ)εε−1 it can be shown that according to
the first order conditions at the symmetric deterministic steady state:
C−σ = ζs1δs − ζs3σγsY C−σ−1 (88)
Y ϕ = ζs1 − ζs2(ϕ+ 1)Y ϕ(1− τ˜)− ζs3C−σ (89)
Y ϕ+1 = −ζs2ϕY ϕ+1 + ζs5(1− θ) (90)
ζs2(1− θ) = ζs4 (91)
ζs3(1− θ) = −ζs4 (92)
ζs2θεK = −ζs3θ(ε− 1)F + ζs4
θ
1− θK (93)
with δs = αs(1− ση) + γsησ. Then
Y = (1− τ˜)− 1σ+ϕ
C = Y
F = K =
Y C−σ
1− θ =
Y ϕ+1(1− τ˜)
1− θ
ΠH = ΠF = 1 Z = 1
ζs1 =
γsσ + (1− τ˜ϕ)
δsϕ+ γsσ
ζs2 =
ζs4
1− θ = −ζ
s
3 = −
δs − (1− τ˜)ϕ
(δsϕ+ γsσ)(1− τ˜) ζ
s
5 =
Y ϕ+1(1− ϕζs3)
1− θ
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is a steady state symmetric solution of the optimal policy problem just stated36.
Consider now the monetary union in the area F 37. Suppose that for all i ∈ [012)
Πit = 1 at all times
38. Then we want to show that given other policymakers strategy,
Πit = 1 for all i ∈ [12 , 1] and t is optimal.
If for all i ∈ [012) Πit = 1 at all times, the optimal policy problem of the monetary
authority in the area F can be written as maximizing:
L =
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
{∫ 1
1
2
[
Cit
1−σ
1− σ −
1
ϕ+ 1
(
Y it Z
i
t
Ait
)ϕ+1]
+ζb,i1,t
[
Y it −
(
Pi,t
PCi,t
)−η (
αsC
i
t + 2(αb − αs)Citση
∫ 1
1
2
Cjt
1−ση
dj + 2(1− αb)Citση
∫ 1
2
0
Cjt
1−ση
dj
)]
+ζb,i2,t
[
Kit −
(
Y it
Ait
)ϕ+1
Zit
ϕ
(1 + µit)(1− τ i)
ε
ε− 1
]
− ζb,i2,t−1θΠεi,tKit
+ζb,i3,t
[
F it − Y it Ci−σt
P it
PCi,t
]
− ζs3,t−1θΠ(ε−1)i,t F it
+ζb,i4,t
F it −Kit
(
1− θΠε−1i,t
1− θ
) 1
ε−1

+ζb,i5,t
Zit − θZit−1Πεi,t − (1− θ)
(
1− θΠε−1i,t
1− θ
) ε
ε−1

+ζb,i6,t
[(
C∗F,t
C∗F,t−1
)−σ
PF,t
P ∗F,t
P ∗F,t−1
PF,t−1
Π−1F,t −
(
Cit
Cit−1
)−σ
Pi,t
PCi,t
PCi,t−1
Pi,t−1
Π−1i,t
]}
di
+
∫ 1
2
0
{
ζb,i7,t
[
Y it −
(
Pi,t
PCi,t
)−η (
αsC
i
t + 2(αb − αs)Citση
∫ 1
2
0
Cjt
1−ση
dj + 2(1− αb)Citση
∫ 1
1
2
Cjt
1−ση
dj
)]
+ζb,i8,t
[(
(1 + µit)(1− τ)
ε
ε− 1
(
Y it
Ait
)ϕ+1)
− Pi,t
PCi,t
Y it C
i
t
−σ
]
di
}
with respect to Cit , Y
i
t for all i and Z
i
t , K
i
t , F
i
t and Πi,t all i ∈ [12 , 1] and where
Pi,t/PCi,t and P
∗
F,t/PF,t are determined consistently with (26) , (27), (84) and (85) .
Assume that µit = µ, A
j
t = A, τ
j = τ and Zjt = Πj,t = 1 for all j ∈ [0, 1] and t.
Moreover assume that Zi−1 = 1 for all i ∈
[
1
2 , 1
]
Given that τ˜ = 1− (1− τ)(1 + µ) εε−1 .
Then according to the first order conditions at the symmetric deterministic steady
36In other words, given a zero inflation policy of the other central banks, zero inflation is a best response
of the central bank of the country i.
37We follow closely Benigno and Benigno (2006).
38..which implies that F it = F , K
i
t = K and
F it
Kit
= 1 for all i and t
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state:
C−σ = ζb1δb + ζ
b
7(1− δb)− ζb3σγbY C−σ−1 − ζb8σ(1− γb)Y C−σ−1 (94)
Y ϕ = ζb1 − ζb2(ϕ+ 1)Y ϕ(1− τ˜)− ζb3C−σ (95)
Y ϕ+1 = −ζb2ϕY ϕ+1 + ζb5(1− θ) (96)
ζb2(1− θ) = ζb4 (97)
ζb3(1− θ) = −ζb4 (98)
ζb2θεK = −ζb3θ(ε− 1)F + ζb4
θ
1− θK (99)
0 = ζb1(1− δb) + ζb7δb − ζb3σ(1− γb)Y C−σ−1 − ζb8σγbY C−σ−1 (100)
0 = ζb7 + ζ
b
8
[
(ϕ+ 1)Y ϕ(1− τ˜)− C−σ] (101)
where δb ≡ (1− ση)αb + ησγb.
Then it is easy to show:
Y = (1− τ˜)− 1σ+ϕ (102)
C = Y (103)
F = K =
Y C−σ
1− θ =
Y ϕ+1(1− τ˜)
1− θ (104)
ΠH = ΠF = 1 Z = 1 (105)
ζb1 = Y
ϕ ζb2 =
ζb4
1− θ = −ζ
b
3 = 0 ζ
b
5 =
Y ϕ+1
1− θ (106)
ζb6 = 0 ζ
b
7 =
τ˜
(1− τ˜)(σ + ϕ) ζ
b
8 =
−Y ϕτ˜
(σ + ϕ)
(107)
Hence being the best response of both monetary union and the small open economy
policymakers, zero inflation is a Nash equilibrium solution in regime A.
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Consider now the case of regime B and suppose that the central bank of area H
set Π−1H,t = 1 for all t. The central bank of the monetary union in area F maximizes:
L =
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
{∫ 1
1
2
[
Cit
1−σ
1− σ −
1
ϕ+ 1
(
Y it Z
i
t
Ait
)ϕ+1]
+ζb,i1,t
[
Y it −
(
Pi,t
PCi,t
)−η (
αsC
i
t + 2(αb − αs)Citση
∫ 1
1
2
Cjt
1−ση
dj + 2(1− αb)Citση
∫ 1
2
0
Cjt
1−ση
dj
)]
+ζb,i2,t
[
Kit −
(
Y it
Ait
)ϕ+1
Zit
ϕ
(1 + µit)(1− τ i)
ε
ε− 1
]
− ζb,i2,t−1θΠεi,tKit
+ζb,i3,t
[
F it − Y it Ci−σt
P it
PCi,t
]
− ζs3,t−1θΠ(ε−1)i,t F it
+ζb,i4,t
F it −Kit
(
1− θΠε−1i,t
1− θ
) 1
ε−1

+ζb,i5,t
Zit − θZit−1Πεi,t − (1− θ)
(
1− θΠε−1i,t
1− θ
) ε
ε−1

+ζb,i6,t
[(
C∗F,t
C∗F,t−1
)−σ
PF,t
P ∗F,t
P ∗F,t−1
PF,t−1
Π−1F,t −
(
Cit
Cit−1
)−σ
Pi,t
PCi,t
PCi,t−1
Pi,t−1
Π−1i,t
]}
di
+
∫ 1
2
0
{
ζb,i7,t
[
Y it −
(
Pi,t
PCi,t
)−η (
αsC
i
t + 2(αb − αs)Citση
∫ 1
2
0
Cjt
1−ση
dj + 2(1− αb)Citση
∫ 1
1
2
Cjt
1−ση
dj
)]
+ζb,i8,t
[
Kit −
(
Y it
Ait
)ϕ+1
Zit
ϕ
(1 + µit)(1− τ i)
ε
ε− 1
]
− ζb,i8,t−1θΠεi,tKit
+ζb,i9,t
[
F it − Y it Ci−σt
P it
PCi,t
]
− ζs9,t−1θΠ(ε−1)i,t F it
+ζb,i10,t
F it −Kit
(
1− θΠε−1i,t
1− θ
) 1
ε−1

+ζb,i11,t
Zit − θZit−1Πεi,t − (1− θ)
(
1− θΠε−1i,t
1− θ
) ε
ε−1

+ζb,i12,t
[(
C∗H,t
C∗H,t−1
)−σ
PH,t
P ∗H,t
P ∗H,t−1
PH,t−1
−
(
Cit
Cit−1
)−σ
Pi,t
PCi,t
PCi,t−1
Pi,t−1
Π−1i,t
]}
di
with respect to Cit , Y
i
t , Z
i
t , K
i
t , F
i
t and Πi,t all i and wherePi,t/PCi,t, P
∗
F,t/PF,t and
P ∗H,t/PH,t are determined consistently with (26) , (27), (84) and (85). Assume that
µit = µ, A
j
t = A, τ
j = τ and Zjt = Πj,t = 1 for all j ∈ [0, 1] and t. Moreover assume
that Zi−1 = 1 for all i Given that τ˜ = 1 − (1 − τ)(1 + µ) εε−1 . Then according to the
first order conditions at the symmetric deterministic steady state it can be shown:
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Y = (1− τ˜)− 1σ+ϕ (108)
C = Y (109)
F = K =
Y C−σ
1− θ =
Y ϕ+1(1− τ˜)
1− θ (110)
ΠH = ΠF = 1 Z = 1 (111)
Therefore for the policymaker of the area F zero inflation is a best response to a
zero inflation policy of the policymaker in the area H. A symmetric problem can be
stated for the policymaker of the monetary union of the area H Thus zero inflation is
a Nash equilibrium policy.
C The purely quadratic approximation to the
welfare
In order to recover the optimal policies we need to approximate up to the second order
single country representative agent utility given by (1) in the following way.
First we can approximate the utility derived from private consumption for generic
region i as:
Cit
1−σ
1− σ '
C1−σ
1− σ + C
1−σ(cˆit +
1
2
(cˆit)
2)− σ
2
C1−σ(cˆit)
2 + t.i.p. (112)
where cˆit stands for the log-deviations of private consumption from the non-stochastic
symmetric steady state39.
Similarly the labor disutility can be approximated by taking into account that
N it =
Y it Z
i
t
Ait
and, as showed by Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005), being Zit =
∫ 1
0
(
pt(hi)
Pi,t
)−ε
dhi:
zˆit '
ε
2
V arhi(pt(h
i)) (113)
In words the approximation of Zit around the symmetric steady state is purely quadratic.
Moreover following Woodford (2001, NBER WP8071) it is possible to show that
∞∑
t=0
βtV arhi(pt(h
i)) = 1λ
∞∑
t=0
βtpi2i,t with λ ≡ (1−θ)(1−βθ)θ . Thus:
1
ϕ+ 1
(
Y it Z
i
t
Ait
)ϕ+1
' 1
ϕ+ 1
Y ϕ+1 + Y ϕ+1(yˆit +
1
2
(yˆit)
2) + Y ϕ+1
ε
2λ
(pii,t)
2 +
ϕ
2
Y ϕ+1(yˆit)
2
−(ϕ+ 1)Y ϕ+1yˆitait + t.i.p. (114)
39From now this convention will be used: xˆt represents the log-deviation of Xt from the steady state.
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C.1 The case of the small open economy
By combining (112) and (114) and taking into account that at the steady state C−σ =
(1 − τ˜)Y ϕ, the second order approximation of welfare of the region i households can
be written as:
∞∑
t=0
βtY ϕ+1E0
[
sˆi
′
t ws −
1
2
sˆi
′
tWs,ssˆ
i
t + sˆ
i′
tWs,eeˆ
i
t
]
+ t.i.p. (115)
where
sˆi
′
t ≡
[
yˆit, cˆ
i
t, pii,t
]
w
′
s ≡ [−1, (1− τ˜), 0] eˆi
′
t ≡
[
cˆH,t, cˆF,t, a
i
t, µ
i
t
]
Ws,s ≡
 (ϕ+ 1) 0 00 (1− τ˜)(σ − 1) 0
0 0 ελ
 Ws,e ≡
 0 0 (ϕ+ 1) 00 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

and with i ∈ [0, 12) cˆH,t ≡ 2
∫ 1
2
0 cˆ
j
tdj and cˆF,t ≡ 2
∫ 1
1
2
cˆjtdj. In order to recover a purely
quadratic approximation to the welfare of the small open economy, we have to use the
second order approximations to both the aggregate demand and the Phillips curves.
The second order approximation to the demand curve can be written as:
0 '
[
sˆi
′
t gs − eˆi
′
t ge +
1
2 sˆ
i′
t Gs,ssˆ
i′
t − sˆi
′
t Gs,ee
i′
t
]
+ s.o.t.i.p. (116)
where
g
′
s ≡ [−1, δs, 0] g
′
e ≡ [−(δb − δs), −(1− δb), 0, 0]
Gs,s ≡
 −1 0 00 δs + ω1 0
0 0 0
 Gs,e ≡

0 0 0 0
2ω1 + 2ω2 −2ω2 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

where δs ≡ αs(1− ησ) + ησ/αs, δb ≡ αb(1− ησ)− αbησ/(1− 2αb) and:
ω1 ≡ (1− αs)ησ(σ − (1− αs)αs(1− ησ))
α2s
ω2 ≡
(1− αb)ησ
(
σ +
(
α2s + (1− 2αb)
)
(1− ησ))
αs(1− 2αb)
As in Benigno and Woodford (2005) the second order approximation to the (54)
and be combined with (52) and (53) to obtain:
V0 =
1− θ
θ
(1− βθ)
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
sˆi
′
t vs − eˆi
′
t ve +
1
2
sˆi
′
t Vs,ssˆ
i
t − sˆi
′
t Vs,eeˆ
i
t
]
+ s.o.t.i.p.
(117)
where
v′s ≡ [ϕ, σγs, 0] v′e ≡ [σ(γs − γb), −σ(1− γb), −(ϕ+ 1), 1]
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Vs,s ≡
 ϕ(ϕ+ 2) σγs 0σγs −ησ2 (γs − 1) γs − σ2γs 0
0 0 ε(ϕ+1)λ

Vs,e ≡
 −2σ(γb − γs) −2σ(1− γb) (ϕ+ 1)2 −(ϕ+ 1)2ησ2γs (γb − γs)) 2ησγ2s (1− γb) 0 0
0 0 0 0

Given (116) and (117), it is possible to rewrite (115) in a purely quadratic way.
Indeed it is easy to show that:
ws = (1− ϕζs)gs − ζsvs (118)
where ζs = (δs − (1− τ˜))/(δsϕ+ γsσ)40:
Then we can write the second order approximation of union welfare as:
Y ϕ+1
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
1
2
sˆi
′
t Ωs,ssˆ
i
t − sˆi
′
t Ωs,eeˆ
i
t
]
+ t.i.p. (119)
where
Ωs,s ≡Ws,s + (1− ϕζs)Gs,s − ζsVs,s Ωs,e ≡Ws,e + (1− ϕζs)Gs,e − ζsVs,e
(120)
and Ωs,s and Ω
′
s,e are respectively equal to:
 (1− ζs(ϕ+ 1))ϕ −ζsγsσ 0−ζsγsσ (1− τ˜)(σ − 1) + ζsσ2γs (η (1− γs) + 1) + (1− ζsϕ)(δs + ω1) 0
0 0 (1−ζs(ϕ+1))ελ


2ζsσ(γb − γs) −2ζsησ2γs (γb − γs) + 2 (1− ζsϕ) (ω1 + ω2) 0
2ζsσ(1− γb) −2ζsησ2γs(1− γb)− 2 (1− ζsϕ)ω2 0
(1− ζs(ϕ+ 1))(ϕ+ 1) 0 0
ζs(ϕ+ 1) 0 0

Now we would like to rewrite this approximation in terms of deviations from the
target of the small open economy policymaker. This target can be determined by
maximizing (119) with respect to sit subject to (45):
The Lagrangian associated to this problem can be written as:
L = Y ϕ+1
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
1
2
sˆi
′
t Ωs,ssˆ
i
t − sˆi
′
t Ωs,eeˆ
i
t − φit
(
sˆi
′
t gs + eˆ
i′
t ge
)]
(121)
The first order condition of L with respect to sˆi
′
t can be read as:
Ωs,ssˆ
i
t − Ωs,eeˆit = φitgs (122)
40Notice that ζs3 = ζs(1− τ˜) and ζs1 = (1− ϕζs) with ζs1 and ζs3 being the lagrange multipliers previously
recovered for the optimal policy problem of the small economy policymaker41.
42
Alternatively:
(1− ζs(ϕ+ 1))ϕyˆi,st − ζsγsσcˆi,st − ζsσ(γb − γs)cˆH,t − ζsσ(1− γb)cˆF,t − (1− ζs(ϕ+ 1))(ϕ+ 1)aˆit
−ζs(ϕ+ 1)µˆit = φi1,t
[(1− τ˜)(σ − 1) + ζs
(
ησ2γs (1− γs) + σ2γs
)
+ (1− ζsϕ)(δs + ω1)]cˆi,st − ζsγsσyˆi,st
+[ζsησ
2γs (γb − γs)− (1− ζsϕ) (ω1 + ω2)]cˆH,t + [ζsησ2γs(1− γb) + (1− ζsϕ)ω2]cˆF,t = −δsφi1,t
(1− ζs(ϕ+ 1)) ε
λ
pii,t = 0
yˆi,st = δscˆ
i,s
t + (δb − δs)cˆH,t + (1− δb)cˆF,t
for all i ∈ [0, 12) and where φit is the lagrange multiplier of (45). Notice that in the
perspective of the small open monetary authority cˆH,t and cˆF,t are taken as exogenous.
Then it is easy to show that (119) can be rewritten as (76). Indeed it is sufficient
to add and subtract the corresponding target in each terms of (119) and then use the
fist order conditions just listed.
C.2 The case of the Monetary Union
If in the area H there is a Monetary Union, then the second order approximation of
average welfare of the union household can be read as:
∞∑
t=0
βtY ϕ+1
∫ 1
2
0
E0
[
sˆi
′
t ws −
1
2
sˆi
′
tWs,ssˆ
i
t + sˆ
i′
tWs,uuˆ
i
t
]
di+ t.i.p. (123)
sˆi
′
t ≡
[
yˆit, cˆ
i
t, pii,t
]
w
′
s ≡ [−1, (1− τ˜), 0] uˆi
′
t ≡
[
ait, µ
i
t
]
Ws,s ≡
 (ϕ+ 1) 0 00 (1− τ˜)(σ − 1) 0
0 0 ελ
 Ws,u ≡
 (ϕ+ 1) 00 0
0 0

A purely quadratic approximation to the welfare of the union households can be
retrieved thanks to the second order approximations of the demand supply curves.
The second order approximation to the demand curve of a generic region i in the
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area H can be read as:
0 ' sˆi′t gs +
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′gSHdi+
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′gSF di+
1
2
sˆi
′
t Gs,ssˆ
i
tdi+
1
2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆi
′
t GsH ,sH sˆ
i
tdi
+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t GsF ,sF sˆ
i
tdi+
1
2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′GSH ,SH
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′GSF ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
+sˆi
′
t Gs,SH
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi+ sˆ
i′
t Gs,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi+
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′GSH ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi+ s.o.t.i.p. (124)
where
g
′
s ≡ [−1, δs, 0] g
′
SH
≡ [0, 2(δb − δs), 0] g′SF ≡ [0, 2(1− δb), 0, ]
Gs,s ≡
 −1 0 00 δs + ω1 0
0 0 0
 GsF ,sF ≡
 0 0 00 2(1− δb) + 2ω3 0
0 0 0

GsH ,sH ≡
 0 0 00 −2ησ2(1− γ2s ) + 2(δb − δs)− 2(ω1 + ω3) 0
0 0 0

GSH ,SH ≡
 0 0 00 4 (ησ2(1− γ2s )− ησ2γb(1− γb) + 2ω1 + 2ω2 + ω3) 0
0 0 0

GSF ,SF ≡
 0 0 00 −4 (ησ2γb(1− γb) + ω3) 0
0 0 0
 Gs,SH ≡
 0 0 00 −2 (ω1 + ω2) 0
0 0 0

Gs,SF ≡
 0 0 00 2ω2 0
0 0 0
 GSH ,SF ≡
 0 0 00 4 (ησ2γb(1− γb)− ω2) 0
0 0 0

and where
ω3 ≡ (1− αb)ησ(σ + 2(1− αb)(1− ησ))
1− 2αb
By integrating (124):
0 '
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′hSHdi+
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′hSF di+
1
2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆi
′
t HsH ,sH sˆ
i
tdi+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t HsF ,sF sˆ
i
tdi
+
1
2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′HSH ,SH
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′HSF ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi+
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′HSH ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
+s.o.t.i.p.
with
h
′
SH
≡ [−1, δb, 0] h′SF ≡ [0, (1− δb), 0, ]
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HsH ,sH ≡
 −1 0 00 −ησ2(1− γ2s ) + δb − ω3 0
0 0 0
 HsF ,sF ≡
 0 0 00 (1− δb) + ω3 0
0 0 0

HSH ,SH ≡
 0 0 00 2ησ2(1− γ2s )− 2ησ2γb(1− γb) + 2ω3 0
0 0 0

HSF ,SF ≡
 0 0 00 −2 (ησ2(1− γb)γb + 2ω3) 0
0 0 0
 HSH ,SF ≡
 0 0 00 2ησ2γb(1− γb) 0
0 0 0

A symmetric approximation can be stated for the resource constraints of the regions
in the area F namely:
0 '
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′fSF di+
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′fSHdi+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t FsF ,sF sˆ
i
tdi+
1
2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆi
′
t FsH ,sH sˆ
i
tdi
+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′FSF ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi+
1
2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′FSH ,SH
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi+
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′FSF ,SH
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
+s.o.t.i.p.
with fSF ≡ hSH , fSH ≡ hSF , FsF ,sF ≡ HsH ,sH , FsH ,sH ≡ HsF ,sF , FSF ,SF ≡ HSH ,SH ,
FSH ,SH ≡ HSF ,SF and FSF ,SH ≡ HSH ,SF .
Conversely the second order approximation of the (54) for the area F can be ob-
tained by combining (52) and (53):
V0 =
1− θ
θ
(1− βθ)
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
sˆi
′
t vs +
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′vSF +
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′vSH − uˆi
′
t vu +
1
2
sˆitVs,ssˆ
i
t
+sˆi
′
t Vs,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi+ sˆ
i′
t Vs,sH
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitVsF ,sF sˆ
i
tdi+
1
2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitVsH ,sH sˆ
i
tdi
+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′VSF ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi+
1
2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′VSH ,SH
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi+
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′VSH ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
−sˆi′t Vs,uuˆit
]
+ s.o.t.i.p. (125)
where
v′s ≡ [ϕ, σγs, 0] v′SF ≡ [0, 2σ(γb − γs), 0] v′SH ≡ [0, 2σ(1− γb), 0] v′u ≡ [ (ϕ+ 1), −1]
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Vs,s ≡
 ϕ(ϕ+ 2) σγs 0σγs ησ2 (1− γs) γs − σ2γs 0
0 0 ε(ϕ+1)λ
 Vs,SF ≡
 0 σ (1− γb) 0σ (1− γb) −2ησ2 (1− γb) γs 0
0 0 0

Vs,SH ≡
 0 σ (γb − γs) 0σ (γb − γs) 2ησ2γs (γs − γb) 0
0 0 0
 VsF ,sF ≡
 0 0 00 2(η − 1)σ2 (1− γb) 0
0 0 0

VsH ,sH ≡
 0 0 00 2(η − 1)σ2 (γb − γs) 0
0 0 0
 VSF ,SF ≡
 0 0 00 −4ησ2 (1− γb)2 0
0 0 0

VSH ,SH ≡
 0 0 00 −4ησ2 (γb − γs)2 0
0 0 0
 VSF ,SH ≡
 0 0 00 −4ησ2 (1− γb) (γb − γs) 0
0 0 0

Vs,u ≡
 (ϕ+ 1)2 −(ϕ+ 1)0 0
0 0

By integrating (127) over
[
1
2 , 1
]
1
2
V0 =
1− θ
θ
(1− βθ)
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[ ∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′rSF +
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′rSH −
∫ 1
1
2
uˆitdi
′ru +
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t RsF ,sF sˆ
i
tdi
+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t RsH ,sH sˆ
i
tdi+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′RSF ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi+
1
2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′RSH ,SH
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
+
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′RSF ,SH
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi−
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t RsF ,uuˆ
i
tdi
]
+ s.o.t.i.p. (126)
where:
r′SF ≡ [ϕ, σγb, 0] r′SH ≡ [0, σ(1− γb), 0] r′u ≡ [(ϕ+ 1), −1]
RsF ,sF ≡
 ϕ(ϕ+ 2) σγs 0σγs −ηγ2sσ2 + ηγbσ2 − γbσ2 0
0 0 ε(ϕ+1)λ
RsH ,sH ≡
 0 0 00 (η − 1)σ2 (1− γb) 0
0 0 0

RSF ,SF ≡
 0 2σ(γb − γs) 02σ(γb − γs) 2ησ2 (γ2s − γ2b ) 0
0 0 0
RSH ,SH ≡
 0 0 00 −2ησ2 (1− γb)2 0
0 0 0

RSF ,SH ≡
 0 σ(1− γb) 0σ(1− γb) −2ησ2 (1− γb) γb 0
0 0 0
RsF ,u ≡
 (ϕ+ 1)2 −(ϕ+ 1)0 0
0 0

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Again a symmetric condition can be stated for the regions of the area H namely:
1
2
V0 =
1− θ
θ
(1− βθ)
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[ ∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′kSH +
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′kSF −
∫ 1
1
2
uˆitdi
′ku +
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitKsH ,sH sˆ
i
tdi
+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′KSH ,SH
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi+
1
2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′KSF ,SF
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi+
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′KSH ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
−
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t KsH ,uuˆ
i
tdi
]
+ s.o.t.i.p. (127)
where kSH = rSF , kSF = rSH , ku = ru, KsH ,sH = RsF ,sF , KSH ,SH = RSF ,SF ,
KSF ,SF = RSH ,SH , KSH ,SF = RSF ,SH and KsH ,u = RsF ,u.
Then it can be shown that:
ws = (1− ϕζb)hSH − (ξ − ζb)ϕfSH − ζbkSH − (ξ − ζb)rSH
0 = (1− ϕζb)hSF − (ξ − ζb)ϕfSF − ζbkSF − (ξ − ζb)rSF (128)
where ζb =
1
2
τ˜
σ+ϕ − δb−1+(1/2)τ˜(1−2γb)σ+(1−2δb)ϕ and ξ =
τ˜
σ+ϕ Hence we can write the second
order approximation of union welfare as:
Y ϕ+1
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[1
2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆi
′
t ΩsH ,sH sˆ
i
tdi+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t ΩsF ,sF sˆ
i
tdi+
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′ΩSH ,SH
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
+
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′ΩSF ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi+
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′ΩSH ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi−
∫ 1
2
0
sˆi
′
t ΩsH ,uuˆ
i
tdi−
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t ΩsF ,uuˆ
i
tdi
]
+t.i.p. (129)
where
ΩsH ,sH ≡Ws,s + (1− ϕζb)HsH ,sH − (ξ − ζb)ϕFsH ,sH − ζbKsH ,sH
ΩsF ,sF ≡ (1− ζbϕ)HsF ,sF − (ξ − ζb)ϕFsF ,sF − (ξ − ζb)RsF ,sF
ΩSH ,SH ≡ 12(1− ζbϕ)HSH ,SH − 12(ξ − ζb)ϕFSH ,SH − 12ζbKSH ,SH − 12(ξ − ζb)RSH ,SH
ΩSF ,SF ≡ 12(1− ζbϕ)HSF ,SF − 12(ξ − ζb)ϕFSF ,SF − 12ζbKSF ,SF − 12(ξ − ζb)RSF ,SF
ΩSH ,SF ≡ (1− ζbϕ)HSH ,SF − (ξ − ζb)ϕF ′SF ,SH − ζbKSH ,SF − (ξ − ζb)R′SF ,SH
ΩsH ,u ≡Ws,u − ζbKsH ,u ΩsF ,u ≡ −(ξ − ζb)RsF ,u (130)
and ΩsH ,sH , ΩsF ,sF , ΩSH ,SH , ΩSF ,SF , ΩSH ,SF , ΩsH ,u and ΩsF ,u are respectively equal
to:
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 (1− ζb(ϕ+ 1))ϕ −ζbσγs 0−ζbσγs ωsHsH 0
0 0 (1−ζb(ϕ+1))ελ

 −(ξ − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)ϕ −(ξ − ζb)σγs 0−(ξ − ζb)σγs ωsFsF 0
0 0 − ((ξ−ζb)(ϕ+1))ελ

 0 −ζbσ (γb − γs) 0−ζbσ (γb − γs) ωSHSH 0
0 0 0

 0 −(ξ − ζb)σ (γb − γs) 0−(ξ − ζb)σ (γb − γs) ωSFSF 0
0 0 0

 0 −ζbσ (1− γb)− (ξ − ζb)σ (1− γb) 0−ζbσ (1− γb)− (ξ − ζb)σ (1− γb) 2ωSHSF 0
0 0 0

 (1− ζb(ϕ+ 1))(ϕ+ 1) ζb(ϕ+ 1)0 0
0 0
  −(ξ − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)2 (ξ − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)0 0
0 0

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with
ωsHsH ≡ (σ − 1) (1− τ˜)
+(1− ζbϕ)
(−ησ2 (1− γ2s)+ δb − ω3)
−(ξ − ζb)ϕ(1− δb + ω3)
−ζb
(−ησ2γ2s + ησ2γb − σ2γb)
− (ξ − ζb)
(
ησ2 (1− γb)− σ2 (1− γb)
)
(131)
(132)
ωsFsF ≡ (1− ζbϕ)(1− δb + ω3)
−(ξ − ζb)ϕ(−ησ2
(
1− γ2s
)
+ δb − ω3)
−ζb
(
ησ2 (1− γb)− σ2 (1− γb)
)
+(ξ − ζb)
(
ησ2γ2s − ησ2γb + σ2γb
)
(133)
ωSHSH ≡ (1− ζbϕ)(ησ2
(
1− γ2s − γb (1− γb)
)
+ ω3)
+(ξ − ζb)ϕ(ησ2γb (1− γb) + ω3)
+ζbησ
2
(
γ2b − γ2s
)
+(ξ − ζb)ησ2 (1− γb)2 (134)
ωSFSF ≡ −(1− ζbϕ)(ησ2γb (1− γb) + ω3)
−(ξ − ζb)ϕ(ησ2
(
1− γ2s − γb (1− γb)
)
+ ω3)
+ζbησ
2 (1− γb) 2
+(ξ − ζb)ησ2
(
γ2b − γ2s
)
(135)
ωSHSF ≡ (1− ζbϕ)ησ2γb (1− γb)
−(ξ − ζb)ϕησ2γb (1− γb)
+ζbησ
2 (1− γb) γb
+(ξ − ζb)ησ2 (1− γb) γb
(136)
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Now we rewrite the welfare approximation in (129) as:
Y ϕ+1
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[1
2
∫ 1
2
0
(
sˆit − 2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
)′
ΩsH ,sH
(
sˆit − 2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
)
di
+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
(
sˆit − 2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
)′
ΩsF ,sF
(
sˆit − 2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
)′
di
−
∫ 1
2
0
(
sˆit − 2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
)′
ΩsH ,u
(
uˆit − 2
∫ 1
2
0
uˆitdi
)
di
−
∫ 1
1
2
(
sˆit − 2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
)′
ΩsF ,u
(
uˆit − 2
∫ 1
1
2
uˆitdi
)
di
+
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′(ΩsH ,sH + ΩSH ,SH )
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
+
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′(ΩsF ,sF + ΩSF ,SF )
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
+
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′ΩSH ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
−2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆi
′
t diΩsH ,u
∫ 1
2
0
uˆitdi
−2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t diΩsF ,u
∫ 1
1
2
uˆitdi
]
+ t.i.p. (137)
Notice that the components expressed as the difference between specific country and
average union variables can be considered terms independent of policy (even if they
should be taken into account for welfare evaluation). Indeed movements in the common
nominal interest rate can just influence the average union economic performance. Thus
(137) can be read as:
Y ϕ+1
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[ ∫ 12
0
sˆitdi
′(ΩsH ,sH + ΩSH ,SH )
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi+
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
′(ΩsF ,sF + ΩSF ,SF )
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi
+
∫ 1
2
0
sˆitdi
′ΩSH ,SF
∫ 1
1
2
sˆitdi− 2
∫ 1
2
0
sˆi
′
t diΩsH ,u
∫ 1
2
0
uˆitdi− 2
∫ 1
1
2
sˆi
′
t diΩsF ,u
∫ 1
1
2
uˆitdi
]
+ t.i.p.
The last step consists in rewriting (138) in terms of gaps with respect to the target of
the policymaker of the monetary union. In order to do so first consider that by (138):
1
2
Y ϕ+1
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[1
2
sˆH,t(ΩsH ,sH + ΩSH ,SH )sˆH,t +
1
2
sˆ′F,t(ΩsF ,sF + ΩSF ,SF )sˆF,t
+sˆH,tΩSH ,SF sˆF,t − sˆH,tΩsH ,uuˆH,t − sˆF,tΩsF ,uuˆF,t
]
+ t.i.p.
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Them it is easy to show that target is determined by maximizing (138) with respect
yˆH,t, yˆF,t, cˆH,t, cˆF,t and piH,t subject to:
yˆH,t = δbcˆH,t + (1− δb)cˆF,t i ∈
[
0,
1
2
)
yˆF,t = δbcˆF,t + (1− δb)cˆH,t i ∈
[
1
2
, 0
]
(138)
In other words the target of the benevolent central bank of the monetary union
coincides with the constrained efficient allocation (namely the allocation that a planner
would choose having as objective (138)). According to the first order conditions with
respect to yˆbH,t, yˆ
b
F,t, cˆ
b
H,t, cˆ
b
F,t and piH,t:
(1− ζb(ϕ+ 1))ϕyˆbH,t − ζbσ
(
γbcˆ
b
H,t + (1− γb) cˆbF,t
)− (1− ζb(ϕ+ 1))(ϕ+ 1)aˆH,t
−ζb(ϕ+ 1)µˆH,t = φH1,t
(139)
−(ξ − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)ϕyˆbF,t − (ξ − ζb)σ
(
γbcˆ
b
F,t + (1− γb) cˆbH,t
)
+ (ξ − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)2aˆF,t
−(ξ − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)µˆF,t = φF1,t
(140)
[(σ − 1)(1− τ˜) + (1− ζbϕ)δb − (ξ − ζb)ϕ(1− δb)] cˆbH,t − ζbσγbyˆbH,t − (ξ − ζb)σ (1− γb) yˆbF,t
+ζbσ
2γb
(
γbcˆ
b
H,t + (1− γb) cˆbF,t
)− (ξ − ζb)σ2 (1− γb) (γbcˆbF,t + (1− γb) cˆbH,t)
+(1− ξϕ)ησ2γb(1− γb)(cˆbH,t − cˆbF,t) = −(δbφH1,t + (1− δb)φF1,t)
(141)
[(1− ζbϕ)(1− δb)− (ξ − ζb)ϕδb] cˆbF,t − (ξ − ζb)σγbyˆbF,t − ζbσ(1− γb)yˆbH,t
+(ξ − ζb)σ2γb
(
γbcˆ
b
F,t + (1− γb) cˆbH,t
)
+ ζbσ
2(1− γb)
(
γbcˆ
b
H,t + (1− γb) cˆbF,t
)
−(1− ξϕ)ησ2γb(1− γb)(cˆbF,t − cˆbH,t) = −(δbφF1,t + (1− δb)φH1,t)
(142)
(1− ζb(ϕ+ 1)) ε
λ
piH,t = 0
(143)
where φH1,t and φ
F
1,t are the lagrange multipliers of constraints (47) and (48). Then
it can be shown that (129) corresponds to (81) (again by adding and subtracting the
target in each term of (129) and then using the conditions just listed) where:
%H ≡
[
(σ − 1)(1− τ˜) + (1− ζb(ϕ+ 1))δb − (ξ − ζb)ϕ(1− δb)− (1− ζbϕ)ησ2γb(1− γb)
+ζbσ
2γ2b + (ξ − ζb)σ2 (1− γb)2
]
%F ≡
[
(1− ζb(ϕ+ 1))(1− δb)− (ξ − ζb)ϕδb + ζbσ2(1− γb)2 + (1− ζbϕ)ησ2γb(1− γb)
+(ξ − ζb)σ2γ2b
]
%H,F ≡ (1− ζbϕ)ησ2γb(1− γb) + ζbσ2γb(1− γb) + (ξ − ζb)σ2 (1− γb) γb
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